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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
After its somewhat more favourable than expected behaviour in Q1, the global 
economy has shown signs of slowing in recent months. At the start of the year, output 
growth was underpinned by an unusually high proportion in the contribution of stockbuilding 
(which in the case of the United Kingdom was associated with the possibility of a no-deal 
Brexit in late March), while the main demand components showed some slackness. Into 
Q2, the main indicators have shown some weakening in activity. Moreover, looking ahead, 
the worsening of trade tensions between the United States and China has heightened the 
risks surrounding the sustainability of the upturn in the global economy. That has had 
considerable consequences for developments on financial markets. In particular, the 
worsening outlook for activity, the decline in inflation expectations and the search for safe 
havens given the reduced appetite for risk have led to a marked decline in sovereign debt 
yields. And in many euro area countries, this has in turn led to broad segments of the 
sovereign debt yield curve posting negative yields. 
In response to the increased uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook, central 
banks have reacted by adopting a more accommodative monetary policy stance. The 
US Federal Reserve’s communiqué following its meeting on 19 June points to the possibility 
that the next interest rate movement will be downwards. Should this occur, it would end 
the cycle of monetary policy tightening in the US economy that began in 2015. 
Euro area economic activity has continued showing signs of weakness, especially in 
industry, the sector most closely linked to global trade. As in other areas, there was a rise in 
GDP growth in Q1 in the euro area too; however, it largely reflected transitory factors. Having 
discounted the contribution of these factors, moderate growth generally remains in place, 
against a background of political uncertainty. Moreover, the slackness of manufacturing activity 
has increased, against the backdrop of the escalating protectionist tensions. In this setting, the 
Eurosystem revised its GDP growth projections slightly downwards for 2020 and 2021. 
Inflationary pressures have remained low. In the projection period, core inflation is expected to 
move on a rising trend underpinned by the continuing but relatively modest growth in activity, 
which would give rise to some rebound in firms’ mark-ups following their recent compression. 
In light of these developments, the ECB Governing Council adopted new monetary 
policy measures at its meeting on 6 June in order to support the convergence of the 
inflation rate towards its objective. Specifically, the Council changed its guidance about 
policy interest rates by announcing that these will hold at their current levels at least until 
the first half of 2020, six months later than previously communicated. Further, it laid out the 
details still to be defined concerning the rates applicable to the new targeted long-term-
term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III). On 18 June, the President of the ECB indicated 
the institution’s readiness to adopt new stimulus measures if necessary, which reinforced 
the above-mentioned downtrend in sovereign debt market yields. 
In contrast to the relative weakness of the euro area, the Spanish economy has 
remained robust. In Q1, on provisional data, Spanish GDP grew by 0.7% (0.3 pp more 
than the euro area).1 The information available to date suggests that the increase in output 
1  See Box 1.2 of the Banco de España Annual Report 2018 (“The resilience of the Spanish economy to the 
downturn in the external enviroment”).
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in Q2 may be 0.6% in Spain (compared with the more marked slowdown in the euro area). 
Employment in the Spanish economy appears to have slowed over the quarter to a greater 
extent than activity. In particular, Social Security registrations in May showed some loss of 
momentum. 
The sustained activity is being supported by the continuing buoyancy of domestic 
demand. The ongoing improvement in households’ and firms’ financial situation, along 
with the persistence of loose financial conditions (despite the emergence of signs that 
banks might be starting to apply stricter lending standards), continue to underpin private 
agents’ spending. Going forward, the pace of private consumption might ease somewhat, 
in view of the likely increase in households’ propensity to save – given the low level of 
saving – and of the slowdown in consumer credit that has already begun to be seen. 
Nonetheless, the rise in real wages will, on the contrary, tend to support this expenditure 
component. 
The buoyancy of private domestic demand contrasts with the weakness of exports. 
Goods exports have continued to perform unfavourably, influenced by the slowdown in 
international trade and in global industrial activity. In turn, these developments are probably 
related to the escalation in protectionism. One sector that is contributing significantly to 
weighing down sales to the rest of the world is the car industry. Since last summer the 
sector has been affected by various shocks. Conversely, following the significant slowdown 
observed over much of 2018, exports of tourist services have since late last year been 
more expansionary. Imports from the rest of the world have felt the impact of the weakness 
of exports, given the high import content of this demand component. In the very short 
term, the sluggishness of sales to the rest of the world is likely to continue, judging by the 
adverse trend of foreign order books. 
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Quarter-on-quarter rates of change on the seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP, and year-on-year rate of change on the original series, in the case 
of the consumer price indices.
b The figure for Q2 is a Banco de España projection.
Despite the slight slowdown in expected growth for Q2, activity in Spain continues to post higher rates than in the euro area. Consumer prices continue 
to grow at a moderate rate, somewhat below that for the euro area as a whole.
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Core inflation has yet to feel the impact of the increase in price pressures which, a 
priori, might be expected as a result of the rise in labour costs and of the sustained 
robustness of demand. The rate of change of the HICP, excluding food and energy, 
remains at below 1%. This is in contrast to the rise in wages and to the gradual widening 
of the positive output gap. The overall indicator has also fallen below this level in May, as 
a result mainly of the slowdown in electricity and fuel prices. And, given the expected path 
of oil futures, the HICP may be expected to weaken further during the second half of the 
year. 
The baseline scenario of the latest Banco de España projections envisages a 
prolongation of the upturn.2 Underpinning this outlook is the fact that the sustained 
increase in activity observed to date has been compatible first, with the maintenance of 
certain macrofinancial equilibria, such as the improvement in external competitiveness, 
mirrored in the persistence of a surplus vis-à-vis the rest of the world; and further, with the 
continued ongoing correction of certain other variables, such as private-sector debt. Also 
adding to this projected favourable trend is the prospect that the accommodative monetary 
policy stance will continue to be conducive to the maintenance of highly favourable 
financial conditions. Moreover, under the assumptions used in the projections exercise 
about the growth of export markets (drawn from the latest Eurosystem projections3), in the 
absence of fresh shocks such growth is expected to pick up gradually as from the final 
stretch of this year. 
This scenario is subject, however, to significant downside risks. These stem essentially 
from the external setting of the Spanish economy. In particular, as noted, recent weeks 
have seen a heightening of the trade tensions between the United States and China. This 
has led to an increase in the likelihood of an unsuccessful outcome for the negotiations 
currently under way. Moreover, the risks of a no-deal Brexit persist, which might have 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 22 May 2019. The shaded cells in grey are Banco de España projections.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP, in percentage points.
c The figure for 2019 Q2 is the average of the April and May year-on-year rates.
MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a) TABLE 1
2018 2019
2017 2018 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rate of change, unless otherwise indicated
6.07.06.05.06.06.06.20.3tcudorp citsemod ssorG    
7.05.03.05.08.08.09.29.2)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubirtnoC    
2.0-2.03.00.02.0-2.0-3.0-1.0)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubirtnoC    
Year-on-year rate of change
4.28.26.24.25.26.25.29.2tnemyolpmE    
3.11.18.13.28.11.17.10.2)PCIH( secirp remusnoc fo xedni desinomraH    
    Harmonised index of consumer prices excluding energy and food 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.2
Price indicators (c)
2  See “June 2019. Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2019-2021): the Banco de España’s 
contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2019 joint forecasting exercise”.
3  See Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, June 2019.
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severe global consequences. Lastly, doubts have not been dispelled over the degree of 
effectiveness of the expansionary measures adopted by the Chinese authorities to boost 
activity in their economy. On the domestic front, a government has still not been formed 
following the elections held two months ago, meaning uncertainty over future economic 
policies prevails. 
In the fiscal realm, the European Commission has recommended that the European 
Council abrogate the Excessive Deficit Procedure to which Spanish public finances 
have been subject over the past decade. However, the general government accounts 
remain in disequilibrium, which will require, according to the rules agreed by the EU 
Member States, the application of measures under the so-called preventive arm of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Compliance with these obligations incurred with the rest of the 
European countries should act as a spur to step up budgetary consolidation. This is 
needed to shore up the resilience of activity and employment in the Spanish economy 
ahead of potential future shocks. 
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The price of a barrel of Brent has risen markedly to date this year. 
Specifically, from end-2018 to late April 2019, the oil price climbed 
40%, to $75, the highest price for this commodity since October 
2018 (that said, there has been a sharp decline subsequently) (see 
Chart 1). As this box sets out, the price rise seen in the first four 
months of the year is chiefly associated with various supply-side 
factors, including the recent cuts in production by OPEC and its 
partners, the US sanctions on Iran and the abrupt decline in 
Venezuelan output (see Chart 2). 
Moreover, dearer crude between January and April may also have 
been partly in response to demand-side factors, insofar as it has 
been accompanied by a perception of some improvement in 
global activity. Initially, economic developments proved somewhat 
more favourable than expected at the start of the year. But the 
recent heightening of trade tensions has reignited doubts over the 
strength of global demand, which may have contributed to the fall 
in oil prices observed over the course of May. 
This box describes in detail the supply-side factors behind dearer 
crude in 2019 to date, and provides a quantification of the 
sensitivity of oil prices to shocks of this nature. One fundamental 
supply element when it comes to explaining price developments is 
the production strategy of OPEC and its partners (OPEC+). Last 
BOX 1THE DETERMINANTS OF RECENT OIL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
SOURCES: International Energy Agency, Bloomberg, IFS and own calculations.
a Supply projections calculated having regard to constant OPEC production.
b Q4 over Q4, except 2019: April over December.
The price of a barrel of Brent has increased considerably in 2019. This rise is associated with the production cuts by OPEC+, with the US sanctions on 
Iran and with the sharp fall in Venezuelan output. The heightening of trade tensions in the recent period extends the doubts over the weakness of the 
global demand for oil.
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BOX 1 THE DETERMINANTS OF RECENT OIL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (cont’d)
December, OPEC+ agreed to cut crude oil extraction by 1.2 million 
barrels a day (mb/d), accounting for 1.2% of the global oil supply. 
This was an attempt to re-balance the market, after the rising trend 
in inventories and the decline in prices observed in the second half 
of 2018. Under the terms agreed, the OPEC countries’ contribution 
to the cut would be 0.8 mb/d, and that of the non-OPEC members, 
0.4 mb/d.1 The aim of the agreement was to try and set a floor to 
the price per barrel of around $60 dollars. On data to April, the 
reduction in output is estimated to have exceeded the 0.4 mb/d 
agreed upon (see Chart 3).2 At its forthcoming meeting in June, 
OPEC+ will have to decide, in view of market developments, 
whether it maintains the cuts and their size. 
Another key factor behind the price rise is the resumption of US 
sanctions on Iran. These include, in particular, a halt in oil 
purchases from Iran.3 As a result of the sanctions, Iranian oil 
production has dipped by almost one-third to 2.6 mb/d and might 
fall to a greater extent in the coming months (see Chart 3). 
The third factor bearing on supply is the collapse of oil production 
in Venezuela.4 True, Venezuelan crude oil production has been 
falling for almost two decades. But the decline has become more 
pronounced in the past three years, from 2.3 mb/d in January 2016 
to 0.8 mb/d in April 2019 (see Chart 3). This slump has been in an 
environment of strong political tensions and a fresh round of US 
sanctions. In perspective, the factors behind this development 
would be related to the secular decline in investment and to the 
shortcomings in the management of firms in the sector. Looking 
ahead, against the backdrop of the difficult political context, the 
outlook is negative. That is due to financial difficulties and to the 
US sanctions, both of which factors prevent the necessary inputs 
being imported to maintain production and to check the 
progressive deterioration in the network of pipelines and 
infrastructure needed for extraction.
To assess the impact on crude prices of a worsening in the 
situation in Iran or Venezuela, a series of simulations have been 
performed with a set of ten alternative models. These consider 
different specifications of the price of a barrel of Brent in real terms 
based on a series of variables (world crude production, various 
indicators of global economic activity – as a proxy for demand – 
and oil inventories of the OECD countries).5 The simulations show 
that a permanent unanticipated shock, consisting of a reduction in 
supply of 1 mb/d, would have an upward impact on the Brent 
per-barrel price of between $6 and $24, with the average effect 
around $15 dollars (Chart 4).
Against this background, if global demand for oil were to trend in 
line with International Energy Agency (IEA) projections, which were 
made before the recent rise in trade tensions, the market could 
tighten again in the short term. There could be possible upward 
risks to crude prices if the supply-side shocks described were to 
increase. However, in the medium term several factors can cap the 
rise in prices. First, OPEC and Russia might react with increases in 
their production to this hypothetical scenario of additional price 
rises. Hence, the Saudi authorities have suggested they might use 
a portion of their spare production capacity (some 2.2 mb/d) to 
accommodate supply. Moreover, the limited fiscal leeway of some 
of the OPEC+ members will foreseeably contribute to encouraging 
increases in production (although given their downward impact on 
prices, it is not obvious they will achieve their revenue-raising 
objective). Lastly, shale-oil production in the United States will 
continue growing, which might consolidate this country’s position 
this year as the leading global oil producer and turn it into a net oil 
exporter.6
In sum, there are arguments that the increase in prices observed 
until end-April might conceivably respond to supply fluctuations. 
In the medium term, it is likely that several of the producer 
countries signatory to the agreement to cut output may not wish it 
to hold over time. And this, along with the supply of shale oil in the 
United States, would tend to restrict the rise in crude prices, at the 
expense of the evolution of demand. In any case, the upcoming 
IEA forecasts may portray a less favourable demand scenario, 
reflecting the forces that appear to have characterised recent oil 
market developments. That would add a downward risk to the 
price of this commodity.1  In any event, Iran, Venezuela and Libya were exempt from production 
cuts.
2  In particular, Saudi Arabia’s production has been 0.5 mb/d below its 
assigned target, while Russia, conversely, showed a compliance rate of 
only 80%. 
3  Iran has the fourth biggest reserves in the world after Venezuela, Saudi 
Arabia and Canada. Whereas before the Iranian revolution in 1979 
production rose to 6 mb/d, it subsequently fell drastically, recovering 
partly only after the lifting of the embargo in 2015, to 3.8 mb/d at the 
start of 2018, 4% of global supply. In principle, it was expected that the 
entry into force of the sanctions on oil purchases would be in November 
2018. However, the US administration introduced exemptions, which 
expired in early May.
4  Venezuela, according to its authorities, has the biggest crude oil reserves 
in the world, some 300 billion barrels of heavy crude. However, much of 
these reserves have very high production costs. According to alternative 
sources, Venezuela’s economically viable oil resources with per-barrel 
prices of $50 would only amount to 75 billion barrels.
5  These models use a Bayesian Structural VAR (BVAR) methodology with 
sign restrictions. The identification used allows a distinction to be drawn 
between supply shocks, global demand, speculative demand and 
idiosyncratic oil demand factors. In any event, it should be pointed out 
that the modelling of oil prices is not trivial, as academic debate shows, 
and the conclusions may change significantly depending on the model 
used.
6  Admittedly, however, other factors would tend to limit the downward 
pressures on prices. Firstly, there are doubts in the market about Saudi 
Arabia’s capacity to expand its output in a sustained manner, and about 
the possibility of OPEC replacing the crude oil varieties produced by Iran 
and Venezuela. Secondly, shale-oil extraction in the United States is 
highly sensitive to prices; thus, if prices fall that would translate into 
output reductions.
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The Chinese economy has experienced a slowdown in recent 
years. This stepped up in the second half of 2018 as a result, 
initially, of the measures previously adopted to reduce the high 
debt in the private sector and, shortly after, of the growing trade 
tensions with the United States. Consequently, Chinese, GDP 
growth has eased from year-on-year rates of over 10% at the start 
of the decade to 6.4% in 2019 Q1, the lowest rate since the global 
financial crisis (see Chart 1.1). 
To address this downturn in activity, the authorities have 
implemented a series of expansionary demand-side policies since 
mid-2018. These have been strengthened following the March 
2019 meeting of the National People’s Congress (the legislative 
body), where, moreover, the growth target was lowered to a range 
of 6%-6.5% (from 6.5% previously). Specifically, the legislative 
body resolved to make fiscal policy more expansionary, whereas 
monetary policy would retain an accommodative but prudent 
stance, with a view to mitigating financial risks. On the fiscal front, 
a stimulus package of around 2% of GDP was incorporated. The 
stimulus would be through cuts in VAT and in Social Security 
contributions, and a raising of the local government debt ceiling 
(the quotas for special bond issuance have increased by over 
50%), in order to boost infrastructure investment (see Chart 1.2). 
As regards monetary policy, the central bank has kept benchmark 
interest rates unchanged, but it has cut the reserve requirement 
ratio by 350 bp since 2018, placing it at 13.5% (see Chart 1.3). 
Furthermore, it has introduced two facilities: one is aimed at 
promoting the granting of medium-term loans to private 
companies, especially to SMEs; and the other enables commercial 
banks to replace perpetual bonds with central bank securities, 
thereby shoring up their capital and affording them greater liquidity, 
since the securities are eligible as collateral in the central bank’s 
lending facilities. Compared with the stimuli applied in the global 
financial crisis and in the 2015-16 slowdown, the current measures 
are on a lesser scale, with a more contained monetary and credit 
impulse. Further, unlike the previous episodes, financial regulations 
and housing market controls are now stricter, which mitigates the 
risks to financial stability although, in turn, this limits the 
effectiveness of the stimulus. 
At the start of the year, these measures appeared to have managed 
to stabilise the economy, with somewhat higher than expected 
growth recorded in 2019 Q1. However, activity appears to be turning 
down again at the start of Q2, which raises some doubts over the 
effectiveness of the policies implemented (see Chart 1.4). Admittedly, 
on one hand, there is normally some lag between the time at which 
the measures are adopted and when they begin to take effect; and, 
on the other, moreover, the fiscal package has not yet been fully 
rolled out. Nonetheless, the moderate impact of the measures 
adopted might be due to the fact that around half of the fiscal 
expansion has been implemented through tax cuts. That tends to 
reduce policy effectiveness in conditions of uncertainty, insofar as 
households and firms tend to save the resulting extra income. 
In any event, the risks to economic growth in China are clearly 
tilted to the downside. In the external arena, the heightening of 
the trade war with the United States may check growth 
considerably. The United States account for almost 23% of total 
Chinese exports (4.2% of GDP). Accordingly, the trade tensions 
might significantly harm the Asian giant’s economy.  The damage 
would not only be through the tariffs channel, but also through 
other indirect channels, such as financial market confidence, the 
re-location of certain segments of global production chains and 
the effects on productivity. On the domestic front, the main 
challenge lies in correctly calibrating the stimuli stemming from 
economic policies. These must strike an appropriate balance 
between prudence and ambition, so as to effectively reduce the 
risks to short-term growth and, at the same time, prevent an 
increase in medium and long-term imbalances, which raises the 
risks of a more abrupt adjustment in the future. China would, 
then, be retaining some room for manoeuvre to further reinforce 
its expansionary demand-side policies should it have to face a 
more unfavourable environment. Specifically, new monetary 
policy measures cannot be ruled out. These might include, for 
example, further cuts in the reserve requirement or action through 
the credit mechanisms that channel liquidity to the sectors most 
affected. On the fiscal policy side, further stimuli will likely be 
announced in the coming quarters, chiefly involving cuts in VAT 
rates and in Social Security contributions, and higher infrastructure 
investment. 
In any event, the space for potential demand-side policy measures 
has shrunk in recent years, owing to the increase in the Chinese 
economy’s debt. The non-financial sector’s debt/GDP ratio has 
grown by 120 pp in 10 years to 260% of GDP in 2018, and the 
deleveraging measures adopted in the past two years have 
managed to stabilise this ratio (see Chart 1.5). In the short run, the 
volume of debt will foreseeably resume its rising path, owing both 
to the recent measures to boost credit and to promote public 
investment in infrastructure, and to the lower growth outlook. That 
all entails greater risks to financial stability in the medium and long 
term. 
In the monetary policy realm, the central bank does have tools to 
boost liquidity and credit. But the main obstacle lies in the limited 
effectiveness of the transmission mechanism, based on 
quantitative and credit-control instruments. These instruments are 
biased towards large corporations and entities linked to the public 
sector, meaning financial system reforms are needed to enable 
balanced access by private firms to financing. Moreover, as 
regards exchange rate flexibility, there are also constraints arising 
from the fear of capital outflows and of the repercussions that a 
heavy depreciation of the renminbi would have for the trade 
tensions with the United States. 
Despite the fact that the official budget deficit and public debt 
ratios are not very high (3.9% and 37% of GDP, respectively), there 
is less fiscal space available if regard is had to a broader perimeter 
of the public sector and its contingent liabilities, along with other 
items, especially those pertaining to local governments and their 
financing vehicles. The IMF estimates that, with a broader 
definition than the usual one, the budget deficit would have been 
BOX 2ECONOMIC POLICY ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN CHINA
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BOX 2 ECONOMIC POLICY ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN CHINA (cont’d)
SOURCES: IMF, BIS and CEIC.
To address the downturn in activity derived from the measures adopted to reduce China's high debt and, also, from the growing trade tensions with the 
United States. the authorities have applied a series of demand-side policies since mid-2018. However, the room for manoeuvre for these policies is 
increasingly smaller.
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BOX 2ECONOMIC POLICY ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE IN CHINA (cont’d)
close to 10% of GDP last year, while public debt would have risen 
to 67.5% of GDP (see Chart 1.6). Compounding this in the medium 
term are the pressures on public finances stemming from 
population ageing, and from lower potential growth.
Against this background, Chinese economic policy should focus on 
structural reforms. Indeed, mindful of the limitations of demand-side 
policies, the Chinese authorities have so far opted for gradualism 
and for limiting the size of the stimuli applied. However, if growth 
were to be further impacted and measures on a greater scale 
were adopted, that might exacerbate the risks to financial 
stability. Ahead of this, the authorities should opt to promote 
comprehensive structural reforms that manage to reduce 
leveraging and enhance the efficiency of credit allocation, 
introducing greater competition into the markets and 
reconsidering the role of State companies.
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At the end of 2018, the US Federal Reserve embarked on a shift in 
its monetary policy stance, which until then had followed a 
progressively tightening path. This shift appeared to have a 
significant impact on world financial markets, in particular 
contributing to reversing the downward trend observed in the 
stock markets of the main advanced and emerging market 
economies in the last four months of 2018. This episode underlines 
the importance of analysing the effect that US monetary policy 
shocks can have on the macro-financial conditions of all the other 
economies. It is also important to understand to what extent these 
shocks shape monetary policy in other jurisdictions, especially 
through short-term interest rates or, where these are close to their 
effective lower bound, medium and long-term rates.
This box analyses the global macro-financial effects of US 
monetary policy by estimating a global vector autoregressive 
(GVAR) model.1 With the model, which comprises a network of 
interdependent economies that account for more than 90% of 
world GDP, it is possible to analyse the spillover effects of US 
monetary policy, considering not only its effects in the countries at 
the receiving end, but also the effects of the rest of the world on 
the US economy (spillback effects).
In the GVAR model, the macro-financial conditions of each 
economy are affected by domestic and external factors. The 
external factors may stem from another economy, as in the case of 
US monetary policy, or from global variables, as in the case of oil 
price fluctuations. Specifically, each economy is represented by a 
VAR model that includes the following national quarterly macro-
financial variables: GDP, inflation, short and long-term interest 
rates, a stock market index and an effective exchange rate. The 
model also captures interaction between economies, as it includes 
a set of external variables, calculated as weighted averages of the 
domestic variables of the other countries, with the weightings 
based on bilateral trade flows, to reflect the relative importance of 
the other countries for each economy. Lastly, it also includes oil 
prices, which are relevant both for inflation and monetary policy, 
as a common factor to all countries.
Once estimated, the model is used to simulate an expansionary 
shift in the US monetary policy stance, in the form of a cut in the 
US short-term interest rate of 25 bp on impact.2 Chart 1 shows the 
responses of US variables (medians and confidence bands at 
68%) and, for purposes of comparison, the responses for the rest 
of the world, obtained by aggregating the individual responses of 
the other economies, weighted by GDP. The expansionary 
monetary shock has the following effects in the United States: on 
impact, GDP growth and inflation increase (by 0.2 pp in both 
cases), the dollar depreciates (by 2%) and stock market prices rise 
(by approximately 4%). More interesting, for the purposes of this 
box, are the macroeconomic and financial effects of the US 
monetary shock on the rest of the world. In particular, global GDP 
growth (excluding the United States) rises by 0.4%, that is, by 
even more than in the US economy itself, while stock market 
prices increase by 5% on impact and by up to 8% after one 
quarter. 
This evidence confirms previous findings in the literature on the 
international effects of monetary shocks in the US economy.3 
These findings are consistent with the idea that US monetary 
policy shifts drive a global financial cycle, with the main implication 
being that monetary policy shocks in the United States trigger 
international synchronisation of financial asset prices and 
volumes.4 
In order to explore whether a flexible exchange rate isolates other 
countries’ monetary policy from the effects of US monetary policy, 
each economy is classified according to whether or not its 
currency is effectively anchored to the US dollar.5 The effects at a 
country level are then aggregated into two groups, according to 
whether the exchange rate is flexible or is anchored to the dollar, 
weighting the different economies according to their share of the 
total GDP of each group. Chart 2 shows the medians of the 
maximum effects (minimum effects in the case of negative 
responses) for the two groups and the average effect at a global 
level. It is observed that the effects on GDP growth and stock 
market prices are more pronounced in the case of economies 
whose currencies are pegged to the dollar. At the same time, the 
effects on economies with flexible exchange rates are considerable, 
and in the case of inflation quite similar to those observed for 
BOX 3
 
GLOBAL MACRO-FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY: A QUANTITATIVE 
EXPLORATION
1  See S. Dées and A. Galesi (2019), “The Policy Trilemma and the Global 
Financial Cycle: Evidence from the International Transmission of 
Unconventional Monetary Policy”, mimeo.
2  Identifying US monetary policy shocks consists in imposing sign 
constraints on the responses of US variables. An expansionary shock 
that reduces the short-term interest rate (and, to a lesser extent, the 
long-term rate) entails, both on impact and one quarter after the shock, 
increases in GDP growth, inflation and share prices, and also a 
depreciation of the dollar. As the strategy places no constraints on other 
countries’ variables, it is completely agnostic as to the size and sign of 
the effects on the rest of the world.
3  Several studies have found that an expansionary shift in US monetary 
policy drives economic activity in many of the countries of the rest of the 
world. See, in particular: G. Georgiadis (2016), “Determinants of global 
spillovers from US monetary policy”, Journal of International Money and 
Finance  67, pp. 41-61; L. Dedola, G. Rivolta and L. Stracca (2017), 
“If  the Fed sneezes, who catches a cold?"  Journal of International 
Economics  108, pp. 23-41; and M. Iacoviello and G. Navarro (2019), 
“Foreign effects of higher US interest rates",  Journal of International 
Money and Finance 92, pp. 232-250.
4  The transmission mechanisms of the global financial cycle are several 
and complex, owing for instance to the presence of frictions in the credit 
channel, the presence of currency mismatch in commercial banks’ 
balance sheets or the “fear of floating” of monetary authorities in 
economies with flexible exchange rates. See H. Rey (2016), “International 
channels of transmission of monetary policy and the Mundellian 
trilemma”, IMF Economic Review, 64, pp. 6-35.
5  Using for this purpose the indicator developed in E. Ilzetzki, C. M. 
Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff (2017), “Exchange arrangements entering the 
21st century: which anchor will hold?”, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper No. 23134.
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BOX 3 GLOBAL MACRO-FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY: A QUANTITATIVE 
EXPLORATION (cont’d)
Chart 1
EFFECTS OF A UNITED STATES EXPANSIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE REST OF THE WORLD (a)
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SOURCES: K. Mohaddes and M. Raissi (2018), "Compilation, Revision and Updating of the Global VAR (GVAR) Database, 1979Q2-2016Q4", University of 
Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, mimeo, and OECD Main Economic Indicators. Compiled drawing on S. Dées and A. Galesi (2019), "The Policy Trilemma and the 
Global Financial Cycle: Evidence from the International Transmission of Unconventional Monetary Policy", mimeo.
a Impulse responses of US variables, medians and confidence bands at 68%, to a US expansionary monetary policy shock that cuts the US short-term interest rate 
by 25 bp on impact. For purposes of comparison, the median responses for the rest of the world are shown, obtained by aggregating the responses of the other 
economies weighted by GDP.
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economies with exchange rates pegged to the dollar. According to 
the logic of the global financial cycle, beyond the commercial 
effects, the credit channel is key to understanding these findings: 
US monetary policy easing drives up prices of financial assets, 
which in turn improves the financial position of banks and eases 
their financial conditions. This improvement in financial conditions 
translates into increased credit, which drives up activity and 
prices.6 The main difference between the two groups of economies 
in Chart 2 is the short-term interest rate response: while central 
banks of countries whose currencies are pegged to the dollar cut 
interest rates to prevent exchange rate appreciation, monetary 
authorities in economies with flexible exchange rates raise interest 
rates to counteract the rise in inflation.
In short, the evidence presented in this box suggests that, even 
though the macroeconomic effects are greater in economies 
whose currencies are pegged to the dollar, US monetary policy 
has a major impact on all economies, including those that adopt a 
flexible exchange rate.
BOX 3 GLOBAL MACRO-FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES MONETARY POLICY: A QUANTITATIVE 
EXPLORATION (cont’d)
Chart 2
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND EFFECTS OF A UNITED STATES EXPANSIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK (a)
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a Medians of the maximum effects (minimum effects in the case of negative responses) for both groups - flexible exchange rate and exchange rate anchored 
to the dollar - and average for the effect at a global level.
6  See H. Rey (2016), op cit.
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BOX 4
The dynamics of corporate mark-ups are one of the proxies 
generally used to explain changes in inflation, such that prices in 
the economy can be understood to be the results of firms applying 
a mark-up to their labour costs. The virtue of this approach is that 
although labour costs only account for some 20% of the cost 
structure of manufacturing firms, and for 40% in the case of firms 
in the services sector, these figures rise to almost 90% excluding 
inputs. Accordingly, when value added deflators, which exclude 
the cost of inputs, are analysed at aggregate level, changes in unit 
labour costs (that is, employee compensation corrected for 
productivity gains) are understood to be a fundamental determinant 
of future changes in prices. 
Nevertheless, a wealth of evidence in the empirical literature 
advises caution regarding the stability of the relationship between 
labour costs and prices, and the shorter the time horizon of the 
analysis of changes in these two variables, the greater the caution 
advised. Much of this evidence relates to the United States, where 
numerous studies suggest that it is difficult to perceive a close link 
between changes in unit labour costs and changes in price 
indicators, and even that the causal relationship could be the 
opposite, with labour costs responding to changes in prices rather 
than vice versa.1 There are also studies that argue that the 
relationship between cost and price could have diminished 
compared with previous decades, since independent monetary 
policy would have given rise to better anchoring of inflation 
expectations.2 
In the case of the euro area, some recent studies suggest that the 
relationship between cost and price is closer than that observed in the 
United States, but that the degree of pass-through of costs to prices 
is incomplete and depends, among other factors, on the type of 
shocks predominant in the economy. For instance, a closer relationship 
is frequently found if demand shocks rather than supply shocks 
predominate. The degree of pass-through of costs to prices also 
depends on the inflation regime, with a lower degree of pass-through 
perceived in low inflation environments (Bobeica et al, 2019).3
Chart 1 depicts the GDP deflator and its labour cost and corporate 
mark-up components in the euro area since the start of the 
current upturn.4 At first, as the chart shows, unit labour costs 
continued to post very moderate rates of growth (around 0.7% on 
average), at the same time as unit margins were rising, albeit at a 
modest pace. Towards the end of 2017 labour costs began to 
increase significantly, against the backdrop of a persistent decline 
in unemployment rates in the euro area as a whole and flat or 
even negative productivity growth (see Chart  2), while margins 
began to contract. As Chart  3 shows, a low degree of pass-
through of labour costs to prices is also observed using consumer 
price indicators, and it has tended to intensify in the most recent 
period.
Although the performance of mark-ups through the cycle also 
depends on the shocks affecting the economy,5 in the case of the 
euro area a relatively close and positive relationship is perceived 
between mark-ups and economic growth (see Chart 4), as mark-
ups tend to increase in upturns and decrease in downturns.
In the most recent period, the slowdown in the rate of growth has 
been associated with a contraction in margins, a phenomenon not 
seen since mid-2012 when the economy was in the throes of the 
sovereign debt crisis. This margin contraction has had different 
levels of intensity in the four large euro area economies (see 
Chart 5). It should be noted, however, that the starting point may 
differ, as in some countries, such as Spain for instance, the 
adjustment of labour costs made during the crisis enabled margins 
to grow. Also, for the euro area aggregate, the margin contraction 
extends across all sectors of activity, with the exception of 
construction (see Chart 6). 
Overall, the low inflation environment in the euro area, together 
with the heightened uncertainty regarding the strength of demand, 
could explain why firms remain highly cautious about passing 
higher labour costs through to prices.
1  R. Bidder (2015), “Are wages useful in forecasting price inflation?”, 
FRBSF Economic Letter, 33; Y. Mehra (2000), “Wage-Price Dynamics: 
Are They Consistent with Cost Push?”, FRB Richmond Economic 
Quarterly 86 (3); and G. Hess and M. Schweitzer (2000), “Does Wage 
Inflation Cause Price Inflation?”, FRB Cleveland Policy Discussion 
Paper 1.
2  E. Peneva and J. Rudd (2015), “The Passthrough of Labor Costs to Price 
Inflation”, Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion 
Series Paper 2015-042.
3  In the case of the euro area, E. Bobeica, M. Ciccarelli and I. Vansteenkiste 
(2019), in “The link between labor cost and price inflation in the euro 
area”, ECB Working Paper No. 2235, find a causal relationship between 
labour costs and prices (Granger causality) that has strengthened over
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EURO AREA LABOUR COSTS AND MARK-UPS
   time. These findings are consistent with the main conclusions drawn 
from the surveys of firms conducted in the framework of the Wage 
Dynamics Network (WDN) (see ECB (2009), “Wage Dynamics in Europe”, 
Final Report of the Wage Dynamics Network), which suggest that a high 
percentage of firms adjust their prices when faced with a permanent 
unexpected labour cost shock.
4  It is very difficult to measure corporate profits. This box uses as a mark-
up indicator the ratio of GDP deflator to unit labour costs, which aims to 
proxy the relationship inferred in economic theory between prices and 
marginal production costs. In view of the difficulty of proxying these 
marginal costs, Spanish National Accounts use average costs and, more 
simply, labour costs. This ignores, for example, the contribution made 
by capital and financial costs, which may be very significant in the 
current low interest rate environment. In this respect, there are alternative 
profit measures, analysed in detail in V. Salas, L. San Juan and J. Vallés 
(2017), “The financial and real performance of non-financial corporations 
in the euro area: 1999-2015”, Banco de España Occasional Paper 1708.
5  C. Nekarda and V. Ramey (2013), “The Cyclical Behavior of the Price-
Cost Markup”, Working Paper 19099, National Bureau of Economic 
Research.
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SOURCE: Eurostat.
a Mark-ups are defined as the ratio of the GDP (or GVA) deflator to ULCs.
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BOX 5
The weakness shown by the euro area car industry from summer 
2018 has continued in the year to date as a result of a combination 
of various factors. On the supply side, the entry into force of the 
new WLTP emissions regulations in the European Union (EU) in 
September 2018 caused some disruption to the manufacturing 
process due to the need to comply with the new legal requirements.1 
Also, the demand for motor vehicles made in the EU has been 
affected both by cyclical factors (such as the downturn in car 
purchases in some of the main emerging economies) and by more 
persistent influences (including particularly the uncertainties 
surrounding the dominant technology in the future and the 
possibility of further regulatory changes). 
The car industry is extremely important in the euro area economies. 
This is particularly so in Germany, where it represents approximately 
5.5% of total value added, a percentage which drops in Spain to 
1.8% (although this is still twice the euro area average).2 Furthermore, 
a high proportion of the industry’s production of both final and 
intermediate goods is exported, making it highly dependent on 
foreign demand. Specifically, car industry exports represent, in gross 
terms, 17.7% of total sales of goods to the rest of the world in 
Germany, 12.1% in Spain and 4.3% in the euro area as a whole.
This box examines the propagation of a shock in car manufacturing 
in each of the four largest euro area economies to other industries 
of the country concerned and to the car industry and other 
industries of the other euro area countries. In this respect, it should 
be noted that the car industry participates extensively in global 
value chains and that its production is thus highly fragmented.3 
The involvement of other industries and countries, depending on 
their specialisation, in the various phases of car manufacturing 
allows the comparative advantages of each of those actors to be 
harnessed. This has positive effects such as the reduction of costs 
and the transfer of knowledge, technology and innovation. The 
downside is that, because of the tight links between industries and 
countries, the propagation of shocks is faster and more complex 
to analyse.
Chart 1 illustrates the structure of the value chain in the 
manufacture of final goods in the car industry for each of the four 
main euro area economies. In Germany, nearly 70% of the value 
added of this industry is generated domestically, while the other 
30% is generated abroad, mainly in other EU countries (such as 
France, Italy and certain eastern European economies). In Spain, 
the weight of domestic value added is considerably lower, standing 
at 48%, while the other 52% is generated mainly in Germany, 
France, Italy and other EU countries. In this situation it can be 
expected that a shock to production in Germany and Spain of a 
certain size affects most strongly the domestic economy in the 
case of Germany and other countries in the case of Spain. In Italy, 
the weight of domestic value added is similar to that in Germany, 
while France is in an intermediate position.
Given these interlinkages, it is important to quantify the impact of 
a shock to the demand for cars produced in one country on the 
1  See Box “Impact of the new emissions regulation on the automobile 
market”, Economic Bulletin, 4/2018, Banco de España.
2  Data taken from “Trade in Value Added (TiVA)” published by the OECD 
with information available to 2015.
Value added contained in each country's car production, according to its source. In the case of the German car industry, approximately 70% of the value 
added contained is domestic, while the remaining percentage mainly comes from other EU economies and eastern European countries. In the case of 
Spain, the car industry is much more dependent on foreign value added, from Germany, France and Italy.
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3  See Prades E. and P. Villanueva (2017)  “Spain in the global value chains” 
Analytical Article, Banco de España.
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BOX 5THE IMPACT OF THE CAR INDUSTRY SLOWDOWN FROM A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
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various industries of that and other countries which provide 
the inputs needed for car production.4 Using the information in the 
world input-output database (WIOD),5 the panels of Chart 2 
illustrate the impact of a 10% fall in the demand for final goods in 
the car industry of each of the four economies considered. In the 
A 10% decline in the demand for finished vehicles in each of the economies translates into an equivalent reduction in production. Given the integration 
of the car industry value chain, a decline in car production in each of the economies will have a knock-on effect on the industry itself (direct effect) and 
on other sectors and countries that provide the inputs needed for car manufacture (indirect effect). Germany and Spain are the countries that would 
suffer the greatest impact on their own gross output and value added, and would have the biggest knock-on effects on other economies, in particular 
in eastern Europe.
Chart 2
CAR INDUSTRY SPILLOVER EFFECTS IN THE EURO AREA (a)
SOURCES: Banco de España calculations and WIOD 2016.
a Note that the relevant impact is on gross value added and not on gross output. The difference between these two variables reflects the need for inputs from other 
countries.
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4  The exercise analyses the impact derived from a fall in vehicle production 
due to a fall in demand, which has an impact on all car industry suppliers. 
But it does not take into account the propagation to the industry’s client 
industries (see Acemoglu et al (2016), “Networks and the macroeconomy: 
an empirical exploration”. For an application to the Spanish economy, see 
Izquierdo, Moral-Benito and Prades (2019) “Propagation of sector 
specific shocks in Spain and other countries”, forthcoming, Banco  de 
España.
5  Specifically, the WIOD contains information, by country and sector, for 
the period 2000-2014. For more details on the construction of this global 
database, see Timmer et al. (2013) “Fragmentation, Income and Jobs. An 
analysis of European Competitiveness” and Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, 
E., Los, B., Stehrer, R. and de Vries, G. J. (2015), “An Illustrated User Guide 
to the World Input–Output Database: the Case of Global Automotive 
Production”, Review of International Economics., 23: 575–605. 
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case of Germany, that shock would have an impact of –0.5 pp on 
its aggregate value added. By economic sector, the most strongly 
affected, apart from that of manufacture of motor vehicles itself, 
would be some manufacturing industries such as “manufacture of 
metals” and “manufacture of plastics” and, within the services 
sector, which suffers one-third of the downturn in activity in 
Germany, there are notable falls in “wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles” and “business process 
outsourcing”. Furthermore, some eastern European economies 
(Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) would be directly 
prejudiced by this negative shock in Germany, with a decrease 
in their value added of around –0.15 pp. The impact on the 
Spanish economy would be very low, since the German car 
industry uses little input from Spain. In the case of the production 
of cars manufactured in Spain, a fall of 10% in their demand 
would give rise to a small impact on domestic value added, of 
around –0.15 pp, since the imports used in their manufacture are 
larger and the weight of the sector in Spain is lower than in 
Germany. Regarding the spillover effect on other economies, 
most notable is the estimated impact on Portugal and other 
eastern European economies such as Hungary and the Czech 
Republic.6
In addition to the considerable fragmentation in the production 
of the cars manufactured in a country, a second aspect of the 
interdependence between economies arises from the fact that a 
high proportion of the output of this industry is produced for 
export. Consideration of the bilateral exports of the finished 
good may distort the analysis, since the value added may reach 
its final destination in the form of a finished product or an 
intermediate input incorporated into the productive process 
in a third country that reaches its final destination indirectly.7 To 
address these measurement problems, Chart 3 presents a 
breakdown by final destination of the value added generated in the 
four European economies analysed. Compared to other industries, 
the car industry is one of the most export orientated. Specifically, the 
percentage of value added that satisfied foreign final demand in 
2015 ranged from 71.4% in Spain to 60.1% in Italy. Moreover, 
there is a certain degree of heterogeneity in geographical 
specialisation. The value added generated in Germany has as its 
main destination economies outside the EU, such as the United 
States, China and other Asian economies, while within the EU, the 
weight of the United Kingdom is notable. In the case of Spain, 
the main destination of the value added is the euro area economies 
and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent Asian economies and 
North America.
In the light of the information presented, it comes as no surprise that 
the recent shocks suffered by the car industry have particularly 
affected Germany, given the industry’s significant weight in the 
economy’s total value added, the comparatively high proportion of 
domestic value added employed in car production and the large 
6  In the specific case of Portugal, for example, the most strongly affected 
sectors would be “manufacture of motor vehicles” itself, and 
“manufacture of plastic products” and “manufacture of metals”).
BOX 5 THE IMPACT OF THE CAR INDUSTRY SLOWDOWN FROM A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España calculations and TiVA 2018.
A high percentage of the value added generated in the car industries in Germany, France, Italy and Spain has a foreign economy as its final destination. 
Value added can arrive at its final destination directly as an export of the final product or as an intermediate product which will be directly absorbed in the 
importing economy; or indirectly as an intermediate good if it has been used for the manufacture of a good or service that has been re-exported from a 
third country. In Germany the weight of the US, UK and Asian markets is notable, whereas Spain has the euro area and UK economies as its main 
destinations.
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7  See Johnson and Noguera (2012) “Accounting for intermediates: 
Production sharing and trade in value added” Journal of International 
Economics 86(2).
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weight of China in the final destinations for its output. These shocks, 
in turn, appear to have been passed through strongly to eastern 
European economies closely linked to German car production. In 
future, the industry faces further challenges arising from changing 
consumer preferences (e.g., there appears to be an increasing 
preference for car sharing as opposed to ownership) and growing 
environmental restrictions (which are already affecting each 
producing country differently according to, among other factors, the 
weight of diesel cars in total production). The information presented 
also suggests that materialisation of currently identified global risks 
would affect the various car-producing countries asymmetrically. In 
particular, while the imposition of tariffs on European car imports in 
the United States would disproportionately affect Germany and Italy, 
the Spanish economy might be especially harmed by the effects of a 
disorderly Brexit or, generally, by negative shocks to the demand for 
cars in EU countries.
BOX 5THE IMPACT OF THE CAR INDUSTRY SLOWDOWN FROM A GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN PERSPECTIVE (cont’d)
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The euro area sovereign debt crisis made it clear how, when the 
cycle turns down, the absence of sound public finances may 
exacerbate budgetary difficulties, the correction of which may 
ultimately require the adoption of fiscal adjustment measures 
which deepen the recession. With a view to the creation of 
budgetary headroom to mitigate these risks and ensure the long-
term sustainability of Member States’ public finances, the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) establishes procedures for the 
supervision of national budgetary policies.1 The purpose of this 
Box is to describe how compliance with these procedures affects 
the Spanish fiscal policy stance in the current economic situation.
There are two tools in the SGP framework which allow follow-up of 
Member States’ public finances according to their situation. First, 
if the budget deficit is above 3% of GDP and/or public debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP and GDP is not being reduced to the relevant 
threshold at a sufficient pace,2 the so-called “corrective 
component” is applied and the economy is said to be subject to 
an excessive deficit procedure. Second, when the government 
deficit and debt are not considered excessive under the 
aforementioned criteria, Member States become subject to the 
requirements of the so-called “preventive component” of the SGP. 
The latter aims to ensure that the fiscal policies of EU countries 
generate sufficient budgetary headroom for them to avoid 
excessive deficits. This means that Member States have to 
achieve budgetary balance in terms of the structural deficit net of 
temporary measures, with certain adjustments to take into account 
two factors which differ across countries: the need to reduce the 
public debt ratio below 60% of GDP and the size of the expected 
impact of population aging.3 This materialises in a medium-term 
objective (MTO) which, in the case of the Spanish economy, is set 
at 0% of GDP.
Spain has been subject to an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) 
since 2009 because of a budget deficit exceeding the limit of 3% 
of GDP. At the cut-off date of this Box, the European authorities 
confirmed that Spain qualified to exit this procedure (which will be 
repealed by the EU Council in early July), because in 2018 the 
general government deficit was below the 3% threshold 
(specifically, 2.5% of GDP) and this situation was judged to be 
sustainable in the future.4 Spain will exit the “corrective arm” and 
simultaneously enter the “preventive arm”.
On the available estimates, the structural deficit in 2018 stood 
above 2% of GDP (see Chart 1). Spain was thus still a long way 
from the medium-term structural budget balance objective (MTO), 
which, as mentioned above, has been set at 0% of GDP. Therefore, 
within the SGP “preventive component” framework, two 
requirements intended to ensure sufficient progress towards that 
objective will be activated. 
BOX 6FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN WITHIN THE EUROPEAN BUDGETARY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
SOURCES: 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update, spring forecast of the EC (May 2019) and Spanish economic forecast of the Banco de España (June 2019).
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1  For more details, see García-Perea and Gordo (2016) “Los mecanismos 
de supervisión presupuestaria de la UEM”, Boletín Económico of the 
Banco de España, 47-60.
2  See Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact – 2019 Edition.
3  It should be taken into account that the structural budget deficit is an 
unobservable variable and thus has to be estimated. For the purpose of 
the European procedure, it is estimated as the difference between the 
observed budget deficit and the cyclical deficit, stripping out the effect 
of temporary and exceptional factors. The cyclical deficit is calculated 
by applying the government revenue and spending elasticities to the 
output gap. The output gap is estimated using a methodology developed 
by the European Commission in conjunction with the Member States 
(see Havik et al. (2014) “The production function methodology for 
calculating potential growth rates and output gaps”, Economic Papers, 
535, European Commission).
4  Recommendation for a Council decision abrogating Decision 2009/417/
EC on the existence of an excessive deficit in Spain.
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BOX 6 FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN WITHIN THE EUROPEAN BUDGETARY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (cont’d)
First, based on its level of debt (above 60% of GDP) and its cyclical 
position (positive output gap), Spain will have to make an annual 
adjustment in structural deficit terms of 0.65 percentage points of 
GDP in 2019 and 2020.5 Second, this structural adjustment must 
be compatible with the primary public spending growth rate below 
0.6% and 0.9% in 2019 and 2020, respectively.6
Additionally, holding public debt above the 60%-of-GDP threshold 
makes it necessary to reduce GDP at a sufficient pace to prevent 
Spain returning to the “corrective arm”, this time due to excessive 
debt (see Chart 2). Specifically, for a debt-to-GDP ratio exceeding 
60% not be considered excessive, the general rule is that this ratio 
must be reduced annually at one-twentieth of the difference from 
60%. However, in the three years following the repeal of the EDP 
(i.e. 2019-2021 in this case), Spain will remain in a transitional 
period which endows a certain degree of flexibility regarding the 
debt rule. This is because a minimum adjustment of the structural 
deficit is required, which ensures compliance with the debt 
criterion at the end of the transitional period.7 In particular, the 
minimum annual structural adjustment required of Spain for 2019 
would be 0.5 pp of GDP.8
However, on the Government’s latest estimates sent to the 
European Commission in April as part of the 2019-2022 Stability 
Programme Update, the structural balance for 2019 is expected to 
worsen by -0.2 pp of GDP (see Chart 1), as compared with the 
required improvements of +0.65 pp under the preventive arm and 
of 0.5 pp under the debt rule. Meanwhile, compared with the 
maximum allowed growth rate of eligible public spending of 0.6%, 
the projected growth of this variable for 2019 in the Stability 
Programme Update is 3.9%.
In this respect, although the Council should not make any 
statement on the Spanish fiscal policy stance until spring 2020, 
once the 2019 data have been published,9 the EU’s recent 
recommendation emphasised that, for the current year, there is a 
significant risk of deviation from the established requirements. 
Should this deviation materialise, the Council would recommend 
that Spain adopt the necessary adjustment measures, non-
compliance with which could even lead to a requirement to make 
a deposit of 0.2% of GDP.5  See the Recommendation for a Council recommendation on the National 
Reform Programme of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the 
2018 and 2019 Stability Programmes of Spain. 
6  With a view to complying with the rule, public expenditure is defined 
excluding the interest burden and non-discretionary spending on 
unemployment benefits. Also excluded is EU programme expenditure 
which is fully offset by revenue from EU funds. Also, given its variability, 
government investment is not included at its annual amount, but rather 
as the average expenditure over four years.
7  This adjustment is known as the minimum linear structural adjustment 
(MLSA). Chart 2.1 shows various public debt paths for Spain in the 
period 2019-2021, including: that resulting from projections by the
SOURCES: 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update and Spanish economic forecast of the Banco de España (June 2019).
a 2019-2022 Stability Programme Update.
b Annual reduction by one-twentieth of the difference from 60%.
c Estimate of the maximum debt compatible with the requirements of the transition period.
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   Directorate General Economics, Statistics and Research of the Banco de 
España, that compatible with the minimum structural adjustment 
(calculated from the EU’s 2019 spring projections) and that resulting from 
application of the general rule.
8  See Assessment of the 2019 Stability Programme for Spain.
9  Compliance with the Council recommendations under the SGP 
“preventive component” is determined by an ex-post check, i.e. based 
on the data published after year-end (see “Vade Mecum on the Stability 
and Growth Pact – 2019 Edition”).
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BOX 6 FISCAL POLICY IN SPAIN WITHIN THE EUROPEAN BUDGETARY GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK (cont’d)
Compliance with the fiscal rules set in the European budgetary 
governance process is a requirement which all member countries 
must meet in order to contribute to maintaining the macroeconomic 
stability of the euro area. But it also constitutes a desirable 
objective from the national standpoint, insofar as it helps to endow 
each country’s public finances with the resilience needed to 
withstand possible future downturns and ensure their long-term 
sustainability.
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On 29 May this year the ECB published the results of the twentieth 
edition of the survey on the access to finance of enterprises in the 
euro area (SAFE), which covers the period from October 2018 to 
March 2019. The survey questions firms, essentially SMEs, about 
developments in the past six months relating to their economic 
and financial situation, their external financing needs and the 
conditions in which they have obtained – or not – such financing.
In the case of Spanish SMEs, the data from this latest edition of 
the survey show overall somewhat less favourable developments 
in their economic and financial situation. The number of firms 
reporting an increase in their sales once again exceeded – for 
the ninth consecutive time – those reporting the opposite. But 
the difference between both groups (net percentage) was 20%, 
4 pp down on the previous survey and also slightly below the 
figure recorded for the euro area as a whole (21%, see Chart 1). 
Costs, both labour and other, increased for a high net proportion 
of SMEs in the sample (57% and 58%, respectively, compared 
with 52% and 57% in the euro area). That led to a less favourable 
trend in profits than in sales. Specifically, the percentage of 
firms reporting a decline in profits exceeded that of those 
reporting the opposite. This had not occurred since 2015. 
Consequently, a net negative percentage of -4% was recorded, 
compared with the zero figure for the euro area as a whole. The 
breakdown by sector shows that the less favourable trend in 
sales and in profits was practically across the board. The 
exception was the wholesale and retail trade, the only sector 
with somewhat more positive percentages (in the case of sales) 
or less negative percentages (in the case of profits) than those 
recorded in the previous edition. 
When questioned about their main source of concern, the lack of 
customers was the reply by the biggest percentage of Spanish 
SMEs (27%, see Chart 2), while in the euro area as a whole the 
problem mentioned with most frequency was, for the third time 
running, the lack of skilled labour (25%). Set against this, access 
to finance was, once again, among all the factors included in this 
question, that cited by the least number of firms: 7% of the total in 
Spain and 8% in the euro area, percentages very similar to those 
recorded six months earlier.
Against this backdrop, the proportion of Spanish SMEs applying 
for bank loans grew by 1 pp, to 29% (see Chart 3). This figure was 
slightly higher than that recorded in the euro area (28%), but 
remains close to the lower figures observed in recent years. 
Access to bank financing continued to improve, albeit at an 
increasingly lower rate (see Chart 4). Thus, in net terms, 16% of 
Spanish SMEs reported an improvement in this respect, 5 pp 
down on the previous survey, although 7 pp above the percentage 
recorded for their euro area counterparts. The respondent firms 
noted a positive trend in most of the factors affecting credit supply, 
albeit to a lesser extent than in the previous edition. Specifically, in 
net terms, 21% of Spanish SMEs perceived a greater readiness of 
banks to grant loans (6 pp below the figure six months earlier), 
13% reported an improvement in the specific situation (4 pp less 
than the previous survey), and also 13% indicated a favourable 
impact associated with their credit track record (1 pp below the 
September 2018 figure). By contrast, 8% of SMEs, in net terms, 
considered that the general economic outlook hampered access 
to credit (compared with 1%, in net terms, that considered the 
opposite in the immediately previous period).
The percentage of SMEs whose financing applications were 
rejected fell slightly, by 1 pp, to 5%, a figure slightly below that 
recorded in the euro area as a whole (6%). Also, the broadest 
indicator of difficulties in obtaining bank loans1 shows a slight 
improvement, with a 1 pp decline in the proportion of companies 
facing such difficulties to 8%, a figure slightly higher than that of 
the euro area (see Chart 5).
Concerning financing conditions, the net percentage of firms 
reporting a decline in interest rates was positive, for the ninth 
consecutive time. However, the resulting figure was very low (1%) 
and similar to that of the previous edition (see Chart 6). The net 
proportion of companies reporting an increase in the amount of 
loans also remained positive (7%, 8 pp less than six months 
earlier). By contrast, Spanish SMEs on the whole reported a slight 
reduction in loan maturities, and a tightening in collateral required 
and in other loan conditions.
In short, the latest edition of the SAFE shows that, between 
October 2018 and March 2019, access by Spanish SMEs to 
external financing continued to improve. However, it did so at a 
more moderate pace than in previous editions, against a 
background in which the economic and financial situation of these 
firms showed some signs of worsening. The survey also reveals 
that Spanish SMEs anticipated, at the time of being questioned, a 
positive trend in their access to bank financing between April and 
September this year. 
BOX 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCESS BY SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING ACCORDING TO THE ECB 
HALF-YEARLY SURVEY
1  This indicator includes companies in one of the following situations: 
those whose applications for funds were rejected; those to which the 
funds were granted but only in part; the companies to which the loan 
was granted but at a cost deemed by the companies to be very high; 
and those which did not apply for financing because they thought it 
would not be granted.
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BOX 7 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ACCESS BY SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING ACCORDING TO THE ECB 
HALF-YEARLY SURVEY (cont’d)
SOURCE: ECB.
a Percentage of firms reporting an increase minus percentage of firms reporting a decline.
b Percentage of firms reporting an improvement minus percentage of firms reporting a worsening
c This indicator reflects the proportion of firms in one of the following situations: those whose applications for funds were rejected; those which were granted funds 
but only a limited amount; those which were granted the loan but at a cost considered by the companies as too high; and those which did not apply for finance 
because they thought it would be rejected (discouraged from applying). The numbers on the horizontal axis depict the rounds of the survey, with 1 corresponding 
to the period April-September 2015 and 8 to the period from October 2018 to March 2019.
d Percentage of firms reporting an improvement in conditions (lower interest rates, increase in amounts and maturities, and reduction in collateral and other required 
conditions) minus percentage of firms reporting a worsening in these conditions.
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2 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Market performance was uneven, with small advances in the main stock indices and 
declines in sovereign debt yields, against a backdrop of high geopolitical uncertainty 
and a more accommodative monetary policy stance
Volatility in the international financial markets was greater in Q2 than in Q1 in light of 
the growing trade tensions. The fluctuating degree of optimism over the outcome of the 
US-China trade talks, and the news on other tariff measures that the United States 
considered imposing on, for example, Mexico and the European Union, largely determined 
the level of risk aversion in the international markets in the quarter. Market performance 
was also shaped to a great extent by the more accommodative monetary policy stance 
adopted by the main central banks in recent months, in view of the deterioration observed 
in certain key activity, price and confidence indicators. This more accommodative bias is 
having a very significant (downward) impact on investors’ future interest rate expectations.
Equity markets remained on the upward path recorded since the start of the year 
until May, when they fell sharply. Following the subsequent recovery in June, the stock 
markets of the main advanced economies – with the exception of Japan – closed the 
quarter with gains (see Chart 2). Most emerging stock markets also rose in the quarter 
overall, except for the Asian markets, hardest hit by the increase in uncertainty and risk 
aversion.
Notable in the quarter was the performance of the bond market segment, with 
widespread falls in sovereign debt yields, down to all-time lows in Germany. This was 
consistent with investors’ search for safe-haven assets, considering the heightened 
geopolitical uncertainty, and with a downward revision of market expectations for future 
benchmark interest rates. In particular, at the close of this report, the markets are factoring 
in, for December 2019, a US Fed Funds rate 75 bp below the current rate (compared with 
the 25 bp decrease they expected at the start of the quarter). The considerable uncertainty 
associated with these expectations was reflected in a significant increase in the implied 
volatility of US sovereign debt, proxied by the MOVE Index (see Chart 2). In turn, in the 
euro area, average investor expectations are for the deposit facility rate to be 10 bp below 
its current level at December 2019, compared with expectations of no change throughout 
the year at the start of the quarter.
High-risk asset spreads moved in accordance with the shifts in risk aversion in the 
quarter. Thus, for example, the US corporate high-yield spread (over the sovereign bond) 
continued to narrow in April, but then widened significantly in May. In June, in line with the 
more positive performance of other markets, these spreads narrowed again (by 38 bp). 
Sovereign spreads in the emerging market economies of Europe and Latin America 
performed very similarly. In the foreign exchange markets, the yen appreciated sharply in 
May, which is consistent with its traditional consideration as a safe-haven asset. In turn, 
the pound sterling depreciated by 2.7% in the quarter owing to the uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit.
The communication policies and decisions of the main central banks are having a 
major impact on market dynamics. Thus, for example, an address by the chairman of 
the Federal Reserve in the first week of June, in which he considered the possibility of 
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interest rate cuts in 2019, triggered a pronounced upward correction in the stock markets. 
This pattern continued when, at its June meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) left its benchmark policy rate unchanged, as expected, but announced possible 
rate cuts going forward. The ECB Governing Council, at its June meeting, extended its 
forward guidance, announcing that the policy rate will remain unchanged at least until the 
first half of 2020, and outlined the characteristics of the new targeted longer-term 
refinancing operations programme (TLTRO-III). The most notable market reaction to both 
these announcements was in the European banking sector, where stock prices fell. The 
address by the ECB President on 18 June, when he suggested that the ECB would be 
prepared to adopt additional monetary policy measures, if necessary, had a greater impact 
on the financial markets. Specifically, stock prices rose and sovereign debt yields fell, 
owing to the increased expectations of possible policy rate cuts.
SOURCE: Datastream.
The quarter was characterised by an increase in volatility and risk aversion, against a backdrop of uncertainty owing to trade tensions and more 
accommodative monetary policies. The main stock markets recorded small gains, while in Spain the IBEX 35 index dropped back slightly. Falling 
sovereign debt yields were the common factor, shaped by the search for safe-haven assets and interest rate cut expectations.
STOCK MARKET PRICES RISE SLIGHTLY AND SOVEREIGN YIELDS DECLINE, AGAINST A BACKDROP OF
INCREASED VOLATILITY
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3 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Although global activity was unexpectedly high in Q1, more recent indicators show 
signs of worsening
In 2019 Q1, global activity growth was somewhat higher than expected. In particular, 
GDP accelerated at the start of the year in the main advanced economies (see Chart 3.1) 
and maintained its rate of growth in China (see Chart 3.2). In the case of China, this possibly 
reflects the effect of the fiscal, monetary and financial stimulus measures introduced by 
the authorities since mid-2018. In general, these global patterns were largely a result of the 
increase in the positive contribution of changes in stock-building, which could be linked to 
a great extent to the high uncertainty stemming from the US-China trade tensions and, in 
the specific case of the United Kingdom, to the continuing doubts surrounding the outcome 
of the Brexit process. In view of these somewhat more positive figures, consensus growth 
forecasts for 2019 overall were revised up slightly or left unchanged (see Chart 3.3). In 
Latin America, activity was worse in Q1, with GDP falling in the region’s main economies, 
while in eastern Europe, Turkey came out of its recent technical recession.
Nevertheless, the latest available figures suggest a generally less positive picture. 
Global activity indicators for Q2 continue to show signs of deceleration, primarily in the 
intermediate goods and investment sectors. In turn, consumer goods and services, which 
had been more resilient, are now also starting to look as if they are running out of steam 
(see Chart 3.4). In the specific case of the Chinese economy, the weakness of the economic 
indicators for Q2 could denote that the effects of the countercyclical economic policy 
measures taken by the Chinese authorities are petering out and that they might prove less 
effective than expected (see Box 2).
Inflation rates in the advanced economies headed down again in May, after the 
temporary upswing in April. The inflation profile has been closely tied to the performance 
of the energy component (see Chart 4.1). Core inflation, which excludes the most volatile 
components (energy and food) is generally still low from a historical standpoint (see 
Chart 4.2). In the emerging market economies, inflation has also been strongly influenced 
by the more volatile components, with core inflation remaining relatively steady or heading 
down.
World trade remains weak as trade tensions escalate
World trade in goods contracted in 2019 Q1. This decrease (-0.3% compared with the 
previous quarter) was a consequence of the decline in trade in emerging Asia, Japan and 
Latin America and the rather sluggish trade in the United States and the euro area (see 
Chart  5.1). In this setting, US-China trade tensions escalated again in May-June. The 
United States raised its tariffs from 10% to 25% on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports 
and banned the sale of critical technology equipment to foreign suppliers (in addition, 
singling out a large technology equipment firm located in China). This was followed by 
retaliatory measures announced by the Chinese authorities and further threats from the 
United States on all other imports from China (see Chart 5.2). In turn, any decision on the 
possibility of the United States levying additional tariffs on imports of vehicles and 
components, which would hit the European Union and Japan the hardest, has been 
postponed for six months, until November. Lastly, the US threat to impose tariffs on 
3.1  External environment 
of the euro area
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imports from Mexico has been neutralised, at least for the time being, by the migratory 
agreement recently reached between the two countries.
Oil prices were highly volatile in the first part of the year. Thus, the price of Brent rose 
until mid-May, up to $75 dollars per barrel, against a backdrop of low inventories, 
production cuts by OPEC and its partners, and lower production in Iran and Venezuela, 
partly explained by US sanctions. In June, however, crude prices fell sharply, down to just 
under $65 dollars in mid-June, owing to the foreseeably adverse effect of trade tensions 
on activity (see Box 1).
The risks to economic activity and the absence of inflationary pressures have 
prompted a shift in expectations on the future monetary policy stance
The central banks of the developed economies have shown that they intend to 
maintain their expansionary monetary policy stance for longer than was initially 
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters, IHS Markit, JP Morgan and Consensus.
In accordance with the higher than expected growth in Q1, the forecasts for the full year in the main economies have been revised up or left unchanged, 
but the high-frequency indicators point to a slowdown in activity more recently.
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planned, or even to strengthen it (see Chart 6.1). This change is mainly on account of 
weakening economic activity and the absence of inflationary pressures as described 
above. Thus, as indicated earlier, in the case of the Federal Reserve, in the space of three 
months futures markets have moved from expecting the policy rate to remain unchanged 
in 2019 to factoring in several rate cuts in the year (see Chart 6.2). Some economies, such 
as Australia and New Zealand, have already cut rates in 2019, while in others, such as the 
United Kingdom or Japan, markets expect benchmark rates to remain unaltered at least 
until the last stretch of 2020.
Emerging market economies have generally left their monetary policy stance 
unchanged, while in some cases it has become more accommodative. There are, 
however, some exceptions to this general rule, specifically Argentina, and temporarily 
Turkey, which have both been forced to tighten their monetary policy.
Emerging financial markets were quite volatile in Q2, on account of the renewed trade 
tensions and the increase in risk aversion
Emerging financial markets posted a changeable performance in the quarter, divided 
into different stages. First they performed well in April, with a marked decline in volatility 
that was underpinned by a favourable external environment, as US stock markets rose to 
new all-time highs on the good prospects for the US-China trade agreement and oil prices 
increased by almost 5%. In addition, the deterioration observed in April in the more 
vulnerable markets (Argentina and Turkey, owing to idiosyncratic factors) did not appear to 
have a significant impact on the other markets. Subsequently, in May, this positive pattern 
reversed as the global environment deteriorated: trade tensions and risk aversion in 
general increased, stock market volatility and interest rates rose and oil prices fell. In 
consequence, financial variables in emerging financial markets dropped back to their mid-
January 2019 levels, with sharp stock market falls (especially in Asia), depreciation of 
currencies and increases in sovereign debt premia (see Chart 7). These markets stabilised 
in June, in line with some positive news flow on the trade front (such as the US-Mexico 
agreement) and the renewed expectations of interest rate cuts in the United States.
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
Inflation rates in the advanced economies move in line with the more volatile components (energy and food); core inflation remains low in historical terms.
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The economic activity of the euro area, following a temporary rebound at the beginning 
of the year, continues to show signs of weakness, particularly in the industrial sector
In the euro area, GDP growth quickened in 2019 Q1, partly due to temporary factors. 
GDP grew by 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in that period, a higher rate than in 2018 Q4 and up 
on that expected some months earlier (see Chart 8.1). By country, the biggest surprises 
were in Germany and Italy, whose GDP returned to growth after two quarters of slippage 
or virtual stagnation (see Chart 8.2). However, this result partly reflects temporary factors 
related to increased sales to the United Kingdom owing to stockbuilding in this country 
prompted by the possibility of a no-deal Brexit at the end of March. Further, private 
consumption in Germany was boosted by an exceptional increase in car registrations due 
to the materialisation of car purchase decisions which had been postponed in the second 
half of  2018 as a result of the adaptation by industry to the new emissions protocol. 
Finally, activity in the construction sector of various countries was favoured by particularly 
good weather. In year-on-year terms the growth of the euro area as a whole remained 
moderate at 1.2%, since the decrease in the contribution from domestic demand was 
offset by a less negative contribution from net external demand (see Chart 8.3).
The most recent information extends the weak economic activity in the short term, 
against a more uncertain global background. A notable development is the worsening 
of economic sentiment, sharper in the sectors exposed to world trade, perhaps reflecting 
the effects of the new protectionist escalation and the prolonged negotiation of the United 
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union. In this respect, the manufacturing confidence 
indicators, the export order book and the expectations of production have weakened with 
respect to the first quarter of the year, particularly in Germany, where the uncertainty 
surrounding the future of the automotive industry is particularly significant (see Box 5). 
Meanwhile, the quantitative indicators available are scant, although they show weakness. 
Specifically, in April the industrial production index (IPI) contracted, while goods exports in 
3.2  The euro area and 
the ECB’s monetary 
policy 
SOURCES: CPB, US Census, PIIE and ECB.
Renewed trade tensions between the United States and China, and between the United States and other trading partners, will ultimately lead not only to 
lower trade but also to lower growth in activity.
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real terms remained stagnant in March. For its part, private consumption continues to be 
driven by employment growth, albeit at a somewhat slower pace than in previous quarters, 
while consumer confidence remains at lower levels than in recent years. 
The macroeconomic projections for the Eurosystem included a slight upward revision 
of the euro area GDP growth expected for 2019, and pointed to a certain deterioration 
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a Futures at 10/06/2019.
The central banks of the developed economies have shown that they intend to maintain their expansionary monetary policy stance for longer than was 
initially planned, or even to strengthen it.
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SOURCE: Thomson Reuters.
a A decline in the index denotes depreciation of the currency against the dollar.
The financial markets performed well in April (save in Argentina and Turkey) and poorly in May and early June, before steadying later in the month.
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of the medium-term growth outlook. GDP is currently expected to grow by 1.2% in 
2019, just 0.1 pp more than was expected in March, as a result of the strong growth figure 
for the first quarter, while the growth expected for 2020 and 2021 is slightly lower at 1.4% 
(see Table 2). Domestic demand remains the basic driver of euro area growth over the 
projection horizon due to the accommodative stance of monetary policy, wage acceleration 
and a slightly expansionary fiscal policy. By contrast, the outlook for growth of external 
demand has worsened. In addition, there continue to be major risks associated with this 
scenario. Along with the increase in protectionism and in the uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit, there are continuing doubts on the domestic front as to the fiscal policy design in 
Italy, to which must be added a complex political scenario in various euro area countries.
Inflationary pressure in the euro area is moderate, although it will foreseeably increase 
gradually in the medium term 
Inflation in the euro area has been affected by the seasonal variability of some 
components. Year-on-year growth of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) 
decreased to 1.2% in May, following a transitory rise of 0.3 pp in April. This development 
was due to the behaviour of tourist package prices, which are highly seasonal. The 
measures of core inflation excluding the most volatile components reflected this pattern of 
volatility, while remaining in any event at very low rates. The CPI excluding unprocessed 
food and energy stood at 0.8% in May (see Chart 9). This low price growth contrasts with 
the robustness which negotiated wage increases continued showing in the opening 
months of the year. The contraction of margins taking place in European firms helps to 
explain this price moderation (see Box 4). Against this background, the Eurosystem 
inflation forecasts have been revised upward due to the expected behaviour of oil prices, 
although the forecast for core inflation is again revised downward for 2019 and 2020 to 
stand at 1.1% and 1.4%, respectively, 0.1 pp less than previous forecasts, after which it 
rises to 1.6% in 2001 (see Box 2).
SOURCES: Eurostat, European Commission, Markit Economics and European Central Bank.
Euro area GDP rose in 2019 Q1, probably due to temporary factors which mainly boosted growth in Germany and Italy, after two quarters of slippage 
and virtual stagnation. However, in the second quarter the momentum of economic activity remains moderate and the weakness of the industrial sector 
is more marked.
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In the most recent review of the stability programmes of the EU Member States, 
Spain abandons the corrective arm of the excessive deficit procedure (EDP), while 
the European Commission considers that there are reasons for applying this 
procedure to Italy. According to the spring package of the European Commission (EC) 
relating to the European Semester, published on 6 May, Spain will be subject to the 
preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact from 2019. Regarding the other Member 
States, in line with the mandate set out in Article 126(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, the Commission has submitted the related reports on Italy, France, 
Belgium and Cyprus, in which it analyses whether or not they meet the conditions for 
initiating an EDP. The Commission’s analyses suggest that Italy does not meet the debt 
criterion and that the related EDP is thus justified. It considers that France currently meets 
the deficit and debt criteria. Belgium does not meet the debt criterion, but there is not 
conclusive evidence on the existence of significant deviations from the path of adjustment 
to the medium-term objectives. The other economic policy recommendations to euro area 
countries more or less generally put increased emphasis on the need to raise investment 
and press ahead in education and social inclusion. It was also noted that slow headway 
has been made in complying with the previous year’s recommendations.
On 10 April and 6 June, the ECB Governing Council resolved to hold the reference 
interest rate unchanged. In addition, the June meeting extended the announced period 
for holding interest rates at the current levels until at least the first half of 2020. These 
decisions were prompted by the downside risks to activity and the growing geopolitical 
uncertainty associated with the trade disputes and the threat of protectionism.
The June meeting also specified the conditions of the new series of targeted longer-
term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III) aimed at preserving favourable bank lending 
conditions. The interest rate on each transaction will be set at a level 10 bp above the 
average rate applied to Eurosystem main refinancing operations. Also, the rate applied for 
banks that sufficiently increase their net lending volume can be as low as the average 
deposit facility rate plus 10 bp. Immediately after the announcement of these conditions, 
which are more restrictive than those of the TLTRO-II programme but fairly near to the 
expectations of investors before the meeting, European banks posted moderate stock 
market gains which, however, subsequently gave rise to losses.
Market expectations as to the future behaviour of interest rates did not change 
substantially on the day the ECB’s monetary policy decisions were announced. 
However, these expectations did vary during the quarter, since the expected date of the 
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF and OECD.
a The figures in brackets are the change with respect to the previous forecast, which relates to March 2019 for the ECB, February for the EC, March for the OECD, 
January for the IMF and May for Consensus.
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first interest rate rise, which in mid-March was September 2020, has now changed to 
October 2022. 
According to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), 2019 Q1 saw a slight tightening of 
credit standards in housing loans and, to a lesser extent, in consumer credit and 
other lending, and a slight relaxation of those applied to firms. For the second quarter 
of the year, banks anticipate easier credit standards in corporate and consumer loans and 
a fresh tightening of credit standards for housing loans. Demand for credit continued to 
expand in 2019 Q1 in the household sector, particularly for house purchases, while it 
remained unchanged in firms. Looking forward to the second quarter of the year, banks 
expect demand to grow in all segments. 
In recent months, credit to the non-financial private sector in the euro area has 
continued to expand. However, year-on-year growth of lending to firms moderated to 
3.9% in April due to the delayed effect of the economic downturn on lending to this 
segment. For its part, household lending continued its gradual improvement (to 3.4% in 
April), since the deceleration of consumer credit is being offset by faster growth of house 
purchase loans and by a moderation in the fall in other lending. The year-on-year growth 
rate of the M3 monetary aggregate stood at 4.7% in April, somewhat higher than in the 
previous months. The narrowest aggregate (M1) grew more quickly in April (to 7.4%, up 
0.8 pp on end-2018).
SOURCE: Eurostat.
a In 2019 including the effect of the transformation in France of the tax deduction for competitiveness and employment (CICE) into a permanent decrease in social 
security contributions.
Overall inflation in the euro area decreased to 1.2% in May due to the effect of the energy and services components, while core inflation fell to 0.8%. No 
feed-through by firms of higher labour costs to prices is apparent.
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4 THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
Financial markets reflected global developments
Spanish financial markets to date in Q2 have been marked by a more risk-averse 
global environment. This gave rise to increased volatility, declines in equity prices and a 
flight to quality. That said, these movements were more moderate than those in 2018 Q4. 
The banking sector was particularly affected by the downward stock market correction. 
Indeed, the level of practically all Spanish institutions’ stock market prices is already lower 
than at end-2018, despite the price revaluation posted in 2019 Q1. By contrast, the market 
as a whole posted increases in valuations from the start of 2019. Specifically, at the cut-off 
date of this report, the IBEX-35 had risen by almost 8% since the beginning of the year, as 
compared with the 15.1% increase in the EUROSTOXX 50 during the same period.
On the government debt markets, the Spanish ten-year bond yield stood at a 
historical low. It fell to 0.37%, around 70 bp less than at the end of March. This change 
was the result of a narrowing by almost 45 bp of the risk premium on Spanish government 
debt vis-à-vis the German benchmark and of the decline, of around 25 bp, in German 
government debt yields, owing to the latter’s role as a safe-haven asset and to the lower 
expectations as regards the future path of interest rates. This change in expectations also 
contributed to the 12-month Euribor having reversed in the last few weeks its rise in 2018. 
It now stands at -0.21%, marking a historical low.
Overall, financial conditions for households and firms have remained loose in recent 
months, although the easing cycle observed in recent years may be tailing off. Thus, 
the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) signals a slight tightening of lending standards in respect 
of households in 2019 Q1 (both in the house purchase and in the consumer credit and 
other lending segments). However, these standards remain unchanged for non-financial 
corporations. The results of the ECB’s survey on the access to finance of enterprises in the 
euro area (SAFE) point to an improvement, once again, in Spanish SMEs’ perception of the 
availability of bank financing during the period from October 2018 to March 2019. This 
increase, however, was the lowest recorded since 2014 (see Box 7). In recent months the 
cost of bank financing has remained at low levels in most segments (see Chart 10). 
Nonetheless, between September 2018 and April 2019 (latest available figure), the average 
interest rates applied to new loans for house purchase increased by 30 bp. This increase, 
which was not seen in the other segments in Spain or in the house purchase segment in 
other European countries, could be related to legislative changes adopted in recent 
months in Spain in connection with real estate and house purchase lending.
The expansionary course of the Spanish economy continues, mainly underpinned by 
domestic demand, and despite weak international trade
The Spanish economy’s growth rate increased in 2019 Q1, against a backdrop of 
uncertainty and sluggish world trade. Specifically, GDP increased by 0.7% in terms of 
the seasonally adjusted quarter-on-quarter rate, 0.1  pp up on 2018 Q4. The slight 
acceleration in GDP is on account of a stronger contribution of domestic demand (see 
Chart 11). The external sector also contributed positively to GDP growth, as a result of 
imports declining more sharply than exports. The more marked decrease in purchases 
abroad is, at least in part, the result of the composition of the fall in exports, which was 
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biased towards high-import-content products, such as automobiles.
According to the Banco de España’s updated projections, GDP is expected to hold 
on its expansionary path in 2019 Q2, with a slight slowdown. GDP is projected to rise 
by 0.6%, as compared with 0.7% in 2019 Q1. The increase in GDP in Q2 will be underpinned 
by domestic demand, with an acceleration in private consumption and investment in 
construction. This growth will offset the foreseeable negative contribution of external 
demand, for which, in any event, only very limited information is as yet available.
The Spanish economy is showing notable resilience in an external environment 
marked by uncertainty and weak global trade. The Spanish economy’s growth 
differential relative to the euro area as a whole is expected to persist in 2019 Q2.
The pace of employment moderated to a greater extent than activity in Q2. The latest 
data available on social security registrations point to a slowdown in Q2. This is sharper in 
the market economy (see Chart  12). In the economy as a whole, employment grew in 
National Accounts terms at a quarter on quarter rate of 0.4%, 0.3  pp down on Q1. 
According to the Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate stood at 14.7% in Q1, 2 pp 
lower than the same period a year earlier. Also in Q1 the rate of decline in the number of 
unemployed slowed somewhat, while the growth rate of the labour force increased.
SOURCES: Morgan Stanley, Datastream and Banco de España.
a The interest rates on bank loans are APRC (Annual Percentage Rate of Charge), i.e. they take bank commissions into account; accordingly, they reflect the actual 
cost of finance for the customer.
b The cost of equity is based on a Gordon three-stage dividend discount model.
c The NDER (Narrowly Defined Effective Rate) interest rate is that which excludes from its calculation the attendant expenses, such as repayment insurance premia 
and the commissions offsetting related direct costs. The NDER definition is laid out in Banco de España Circular 1/2010 of 27 January 2010.
In recent months the interest rates applied to new lending and to other financing have held at low levels, very close to their historical lows. However, 
between September 2018 and April this year, the cost for house purchase has increased by around 20 bp (which would be 30 bp including bank 
commissions). This has not been observed in the other segments or in other euro area countries, and would appear to be the result of legislative changes 
recently introduced into the real estate lending market.
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The pace of domestic demand remains high, although consumption could lose 
momentum in the future
Household consumption continued to show substantial strength in Q2. Based on the 
information available, it is estimated that this component grew around 0.5% quarter-on-
quarter in Q2, supported by the stabilisation of the confidence indices following the 
declines in prior quarters (see Chart 13). Employment creation continued to underpin the 
buoyancy of household income. Favourable financial conditions continue to support 
private consumption. The same is true for households’ financial situation, insofar as  the 
debt ratio has continued to decrease as has, to a lesser degree, the debt burden ratio 
relative to gross disposable income. At the same time, wealth increased, mainly on the 
back of higher house prices and lower financial liabilities.
The lower saving rate and the robustness of credit earmarked for financing private 
consumption raise some uncertainty about the continuity of the strength observed in 
this type of expenditure. Households are assigning a higher proportion of their income to 
current expenditure, which has led the saving rate to a level close to its historical low, 
according to the latest available data. As a result, saving is insufficient to finance household 
spending on investment, giving rise to growing financing needs. Also, the volume of new 
consumer loans continued increasing, albeit on a slowing path. According to the BLS, this 
recent development appears to reflect tighter lending conditions and a decline in the 
demand for loans, a pattern not seen since 2013 Q1. 
Residential investment has also remained expansionary in the most recent period. 
The real estate market remained buoyant, as regards both house sales and purchases, and 
house prices. However, there are certain signs of business confidence in construction and 
of the growth of Social Security registrations in the sector. The moderate, though ongoing, 
SOURCES: INE, ECB and Banco de España.
a Banco de España forecasts for 2019 Q2.
The Spanish economy continues to be more dynamic than the other main euro area economies. Output growth will continue to be underpinned by 
domestic demand.
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increase in building permits suggests that the recovery of this component of demand will 
continue in the future. As regards lending for house purchase, the latest BLS data point to 
an improvement in demand in 2019 Q1, a pattern which banks anticipated would continue 
in Q2, while pointing towards a tightening of lending standards. 
Real estate activity and prices continue to show heterogeneity in terms of 
geographical location. There are appreciable regional differences in the real estate 
market’s pace of recovery, both in terms of purchases and sales and of prices. The fastest 
growth rates relate to large cities and the coast, where activity and foreign demand for 
housing are more buoyant and there is a higher population density. 
Following its strong rate of increase in Q1, the buoyancy of business investment has 
recently become more contained. The continuing strength of investment is in keeping 
with the extension of the expansionary path of the economy, against a backdrop of high 
capacity utilisation and accommodative financial conditions (see Chart  14). Also, the 
decrease in the sectoral debt ratio strengthened the financial position of non-financial 
corporations. In any event, ongoing uncertainty about economic policy and risks to global 
trade are factors that might check the expansion of this demand component.
The growth rate of non-financial corporations’ external financing has risen in recent 
months, but remains moderate. This development mainly reflects the acceleration in 
fixed-income securities issuance, while lending continued to decline owing to demand-
side factors, according to the BLS.
Foreign trade flows remain weak, especially on the export side
The external sector is expected to post a negative contribution in Q2, mirroring the 
more marked increase in imports as compared with exports. Foreign transactions 
posted unforeseen declines in Q1, which are expected to be gradually reversed. On the 
very partial information available, goods trade with the rest of the world shows signs of a 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
Employment growth has eased slightly in the most recent period, a development that will not prevent a prolongation of the declining path of the 
unemployment rate.
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gradual realignment with its determinants, particularly in the case of imports (see Chart 
15). On the export side, the depreciation by the euro since the start of the year would 
support a more favourable outlook for exports, following the significant appreciation since 
2017. The impact of price competitiveness on Spanish exports is relatively high. This is 
due in part to their composition, given that low and medium-low technology-intensive 
exports have a greater relative weight than in the main euro area countries. However, the 
scale and persistence of the gradual improvement in exports over the coming quarters will 
depend on the extent to which external markets actually pick up. That follows the weakness 
shown by trade globally and in the euro area, which is Spain’s main export market. In this 
respect, the indicators of the outlook for foreign orders by the main areas point to some 
continuation of this contractionary trend in the coming months. In addition, car exports still 
show no signs of recovery, following the adverse impact that the adoption of the new 
emissions regulations entailed. This path of exports has a bearing, in turn, on import 
dynamics, given the high import content of sales abroad, particularly in certain sectors, 
SOURCES: European Commission, IHS Markit, INE and Banco de España.
a Banco de España forecasts for 2019 Q2.
b Calculations using three-month cumulative flow.
Private consumption is expected to continue posting relatively high growth rates in Q2, although the low saving rate and the slowdown in lending pose 
risks for the medium-term continuity of this trajectory.
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including most notably the car industry. Indeed, the significant decline in imports in Q1 
was influenced, at least in part, by the fall-off in car sales abroad. 
The slackness of goods exports in Q1 was across the board in terms of markets and 
particularly affected consumer goods. On Customs figures, the decline in real goods 
exports largely mirrored the reduction in sales of non-food consumer goods, in particular 
cars. Capital goods exports were also weak. By geographical area, the reduction was 
more marked in exports to the euro area and to non-Community markets. Real imports are 
moving, according to Customs figures, on a path of recovery, in line with the forecast 
trajectory of final demand, and despite the decline in energy purchases. Most notable 
among other products is the pace of capital goods imports. 
Turning to services exports, the improvement observed in tourism since the final 
stretch of 2018 has continued. On the latest available indicators, to April, the rise in total 
tourist spending has been underpinned by the increase in average spending per tourist 
SOURCES: European Commission, www.policyuncertainty.com, INE and Banco de España.
a Includes machinery, capital goods, armament systems, cultivated biological resources and intellectual property products. Banco de España forecasts for 2019 Q2.
b Calculated using three-month cumulative flow.
Investment in capital goods and intangibles is underpinned by high capacity utilisation, the improvement in firms’ financial position and the looseness of 
financial conditions. However, uncertainty in the external environment is a factor of risk.
FUENTES : Bl oomberg, 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Q-O-Q RATES Y-O-Y RATES (right-hand scale)
1  INVESTMENT IN EQUIPMENT, INTANGIBLES AND OTHER (a)
%
THE PACE OF BUSINESS INVESTMENT EASES FOLLOWING THE STRONG RISE THE PREVIOUS QUARTER
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CAPACITY UTILISATION
LONG-TERM AVERAGE
AVERAGE FOR LAST FIVE YEARS
2  CAPACITY UTILISATION IN INDUSTRY
%
CHART 14
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
UP TO €1 MILLION > €1 MILLION
4  NEW LOANS FOR CORPORATIONS
Year-on-year growth (b)
%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2017 2018 2019
SPAIN ITALY AVERAGE GERMANY-FRANCE
3  ECONOMIC POLICY UNCERTAINTY INDICATOR
January 2017 = 100
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 44 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 2/2019 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
and in foreign tourist inflows. In the course of the year the geographical diversification of 
tourist inflows has continued, as a result of the rise in those from non-Community countries. 
Within the EU, inflows from Germany have picked up while British tourism has tended to 
flatten. 
The increase in activity has been underpinned by construction and by the prolongation 
of the growth path of services 
By sector, the indicators point to some slowdown in activity in industry. In recent 
months in particular there has been an observable slowdown in the pace of Social Security 
registrations and relatively unfavourable behaviour in the case of the scant indicators of 
activity available for Q2. Moreover, as regards the confidence indicators, the worsening 
path of the manufacturing PMI has become more entrenched as a result of the weakness of 
international trade and of the unfavourable outlook for the external environment (see Chart 
14). As to services and construction, the conjunctural information drawn from the confidence 
indicators and from the figures on registrations is consistent with some easing in activity. 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Industria Comercio y Turismo, European Commission, Markit and Banco de España.
a Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) figures at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series. Banco de España forecasts for 2019 Q1.
In 2019 Q2 a negative contribution by the external sector to quarter-on-quarter output growth is foreseen, against the background of a pick-up in imports 
more marked than that in exports.
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The slow correction of the budget deficit continues, against a background of growth in 
revenue and expenditure
The latest available information shows a continuation of the mild correction in the 
budget deficit. Excluding local government, the general government balance stood in 
2019 Q1 at 0.3% of GDP, 0.1 pp down on the same period a year earlier. This slight 
improvement is chiefly the result of the buoyancy of revenue, in a setting in which 
expenditure is also moving at a brisk pace (of over 4%). Of note under revenue is the 
behaviour of Social Security contributions, whose growth partly reflects the measures 
approved in late 2018. These developments should contribute to improving the budgetary 
balance for the year as a whole. 
The European authorities have confirmed in June that the general government sector 
has left its “excessive deficit” situation behind, but there is a risk of failing to comply 
with the recommendations for 2019. In early July the EU Council will approve the 
abrogation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, to which the Spanish economy has been 
subject since 2009. Spanish public finances will now come under the so-called preventive 
arm of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. Given the persistence of the Spanish public 
finances shortfall, the preventive arm also entails obligations for general government. In 
2019 as a whole these will involve, according to the EC’s recommendations, an adjustment 
in the structural balance of 0.65 pp of GDP and maximum growth in eligible spending of 
0.6%. According to the Spanish government’s Stability Programme Update last April, 
these figures would not be met (see Box 6). 
Diminished dynamism of prices in the absence of significant external inflationary 
pressures, although wages are rising
Inflation, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), eased in May 
to 0.9% (see Chart 16). This reflected the slowdown in energy and food prices, habitually the 
most volatile components. Core inflation grew by 1% in May, a similar rate to that being 
observed since late 2017. This is despite the fact that the output gap, which measures the 
degree of use of productive factors, has widened. In terms of components, services inflation 
stood at 1.4%, after temporarily rising in April owing to Easter week falling on different dates 
in 2019 and 2018. Non-energy industrial goods prices quickened slightly, to 0.4%, their 
highest rate since early 2017. In the euro area as a whole, price-rise patterns were relatively 
similar across the different components, although inflation stood above that in Spain. As a 
result, the inflation differential in Spain vis-à-vis the euro area remains negative.
External inflationary pressures are moderate, despite the recent increase in oil 
prices. Crude oil prices moved on a rising trajectory to May and have declined thereafter. 
On information drawn from the futures markets, this decline is expected to continue to the 
end of the year. The year-on-year growth rate of industrial producer prices remains very 
moderate. Conversely, some quickening is discernible in the import prices of these 
products, whose inflation rates remains, in any event, at relatively contained levels. 
The inflation rate in Spain in recent months has tended to stand below forecast. In 
particular, the increase in the energy component has been lower than expected, as a result 
of the negative surprises in electricity and gas prices. That has led to a downward revision 
of HICP projections for 2019 as a whole. However, the projection for the HICP excluding 
energy and food for the whole of 2019 has scarcely moved in recent months, currently 
standing at somewhat above 1%. 
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SOURCES: INE, Eurostat, Reuters, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social and Banco de España.
a Indices calculated on the basis of PPI and IPIIP items that are reflected in the HICP.
b On information to May 2019.
c Implied inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
Inflation in Spain maintains a negative differential with that of the euro area, against the backdrop of lower-than-expected increases in the energy 
component, while core inflation is moving on a similar course. External inflationary pressures remain contained and a rise in wage costs is discernible.
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On the costs side, wage indicators have risen in 2019. Wage rates under collective 
bargaining agreements have, on data to May, risen appreciably on the previous year, 
affecting what is now a very high number of workers. Specifically, the agreed wage rise for 
2019 is, on average, 2.2%, 0.5 pp up on 2018. For the moment, most of these agreements 
are those made in previous years, while newly signed agreements still account for a 
scarcely representative figure. In any event, the degree of pass-through of higher wage 
costs to prices is uncertain; as is occurring in the rest of the euro area, firms’ mark-ups 
appear to be accommodating these increases.
24.6.2019.
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RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2019 Q1
Álvaro Menéndez
Published on 20 June 2019
On information from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey 
(CBQ), activity at non-financial corporations remained expansionary in 2019 Q1, although some 
indicators point to a certain degree of deceleration. Employment continued to rise, but also at a 
slower pace than in 2018. In this setting, corporate profitability ratios held steady, while borrowing 
costs declined again, prompting a further slight widening of the spread between return on 
investment and the cost of debt. Debt ratios rose somewhat, reversing the downward pattern of 
recent years. Lastly, the decline in borrowing costs and the growth in profit led to a further decrease 
in the debt burden ratio, down to all-time lows in the CBQ historical series. The article includes a 
box that analyses certain aspects of the recent performance of SMEs in Spain, drawing on 
qualitative data taken from the ECB’s survey on access to finance of enterprises (SAFE).
CHARACTERISATION OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN SPAIN FROM A EUROPEAN 
PERSPECTIVE
Pilar García Perea and Concepción Román
Published on 18 June 2019
In Spain, self-employment currently accounts for 16% of those employed, a proportion slightly 
higher than the EU average. Compared with the prevailing structure among employees, it is 
males, the over-50s, those with a low level of educational attainment and those employed in 
traditional sectors such as agriculture, wholesale and retail trade, transport and accommodation 
who are over-represented in this group. Relative to self-employed workers in the EU, self-
employment in Spain accounts for a smaller proportion of the total in the liberal professions in 
services, generally associated with a higher level of skill. In Spain, the incidence of self-
employment economically dependent on a single client is relatively moderate compared with 
other European countries; but the high incidence of the self-employed who choose to work as 
such out of necessity, given the lack of alternatives, is notable. Lastly, in all euro area countries, 
households with a self-employed family head are seen to be wealthier than those with a wage-
earning family head, and Spain is in an intermediate position.
THE IMPACT OF TLTROs ON BANKS’ LENDING POLICIES: THE ROLE 
OF COMPETITION
Miguel García-Posada Gómez 
Published on 13 June 2019
This article assesses the impact of the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) on the credit supply of the euro area banks. An empirical approach 
is used that permits distinction between the direct and indirect effects of the TLTROs. The direct 
effects are that banks participating in the TLTROs increase their credit supply thanks to the lower 
costs prompted by these refinancing operations. The indirect effects stem from the changes that 
the TLTROs produce in the competition between banks in the loan and deposit markets and which 
also affect banks that do not participate directly in the programme, albeit in principle with an 
ambiguous sign. Taking a sample of 130 banks from 13 countries and their confidential replies to 
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the ECB Bank Lending Survey, it is found that the TLTROs played a direct part in reducing the 
margins on lower risk loans and easing credit standards in the large enterprises segment. As 
regards the indirect effects, it is observed that the TLTROs also eased credit standards at non-
participating banks, primarily at banks exposed to high competitive pressure, so it appears that the 
TLTROs increased the supply of bank credit through the indirect channel also.
FINANCIAL FLOWS AND BALANCE SHEETS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS IN 2018
Víctor García-Vaquero and Juan Carlos Casado
Published on 11 June 2019
The Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy (FASE) show that in 2018 households received 
positive net bank financing for the first time since 2011, mainly due to the increase in consumer 
credit and other lending, while their saving ratio continued to fall, to a new historical low. These 
developments were, however, compatible with a further reduction in household bank debt (to 
59% of GDP, down 26 percentage points (pp) from its peak in 2010). At the same time, the gross 
financial wealth of households edged down, for the first time since 2012, mainly as a result of 
the fall in value of their holdings of financial instruments caused by the global financial market 
tensions in the latter months of 2018. As regards firms, although their total borrowing in 
consolidated terms was positive in 2018, their debt ratio fell to 75% of GDP at the end of the 
year (down 43 pp from its 2010 peak). The market value of the equity securities of firms fell by 
4.1% in 2018. This fall, the first since 2008, was a consequence of moderate fund raising and 
especially of the decline in value of these liabilities, largely owing to the drop in stock market 
indices at the end of 2018 (this drop was, however, reversed in the first few months of 2019).
REAL-TIME REGIONAL GDP FORECASTING: STATISTICAL ASPECTS 
AND A FORECASTING MODEL
Concha Artola, María Gil, Danilo Leiva, Javier J. Pérez and Alberto Urtasun 
Published on 4 June 2019
The monitoring of the regional economic situation takes on particular importance in highly 
decentralised countries, such as Spain. Against this background, this article summarises the key 
aspects of the BayFaR model (Bayesian Factor model for Regions), a new tool used by the Banco de 
España for the short-term forecasting of the GDP of the Spanish economy and of its biggest regions. 
The tool allows monthly indicators of activity to be combined with quarterly GDP, the benchmark 
variable for conjunctural analysis. In Spain’s case, however, it is necessary to use alternative measures 
of this variable. This is because the official statistics do not provide a homogeneous measure for all 
the regions, nor one that is consistent with INE’s national quarterly GDP.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 
OF SPAIN IN 2018
Pana Alves, César Martín and Irene Roibás 
Published on 23 May 2019
According to the balance of payments (BoP) statistics, in an environment of ongoing economic 
upturn, Spain was once again a net lender in 2018, albeit to a lesser extent than in preceding years. 
The decline in net lending is explained by the decrease in the goods and services surplus, which 
largely reflected the slowdown in external markets, the negative impact on exports of the cumulative 
euro appreciation since 2017 and the rise in oil prices. The nation’s net lending, the positive amount 
of other flows and GDP growth were conducive to a decline in the Spanish economy’s negative net 
international investment position (IIP), as a percentage of GDP, for the fourth year in succession. In 
terms of financial flows, international investors made net purchases under the portfolio investment 
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(mainly, long-term bonds issued by general government) and direct investment headings in 2018, 
a sign of their continuing confidence in the Spanish economy, despite the deterioration in the global 
macro-financial scenario in the second half of the year. However, the fact that the Spanish 
economy’s negative net IIP remains high (77.1% of GDP), both historically and by international 
standards, makes it vulnerable to shocks in the international capital markets.
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NEW DATA SOURCES FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
AND OFFICIAL STATISTICS
Corinna Ghirelli, Juan Peñalosa, Javier J. Pérez and Alberto Urtasun 
Published on 22 May 2019
On the back of new technologies, new data sources are emerging. These are of very high frequency, 
with greater granularity than traditional sources, and can be accessed across the board, in many 
cases, by the different economic agents. Such developments open up new avenues and new 
opportunities for official statistics and for economic analysis. From a central bank’s standpoint, the 
use and incorporation of these data into its traditional tasks poses significant challenges, arising 
from their management, storage, security and confidentiality. Further, there are problems with their 
statistical representativeness. Given that these data are available to many agents, and not 
exclusively to official statistics institutions, there is a risk that different measures of the same 
phenomenon may be generated, with heterogeneous quality standards, giving rise to confusion 
among the public. Some of these sources, which consist of unstructured data such as text, require 
new processing techniques so that they can be integrated into economic analysis in an appropriate 
format (quantitative). In addition, their use entails the incorporation of machine learning techniques, 
among others, into traditional analysis methodologies. This article reviews, from a central bank’s 
standpoint, some of the possibilities and implications of this new phenomenon for economic 
analysis and official statistics, with examples of recent studies.
THE IMPACT OF CHINA ON LATIN AMERICA: TRADE AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT CHANNELS
Jacopo Timini and Ayman El-Dahrawy Sánchez-Albornoz 
Published on 17 May 2019
The economic, political and institutional ties between Latin America and China have become 
closer as the Chinese economy has grown. Indeed, as a result of its rapid economic growth, 
China now plays a systemic role in the world economy. However, since the global financial 
crisis, the Chinese economic model has shown signs of exhaustion and controlling the rate of 
growth may prove to be a particularly difficult challenge, taking into account the profound 
structural transformation to be addressed and the high level of debt of the Chinese economy. 
Against this backdrop, the article provides an empirical analysis of the effects on the Latin 
American countries’ growth of their trade and investment relations with China. It also analyses 
the channels through which the Chinese economic slowdown is transmitted to the region. The 
study shows that, through the trade channel at least, an unexpected slowdown in China could 
have a negative impact on economic growth in Latin America.
CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING ECONOMIES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
AND DRIVERS
Luis Molina and Francesca Viani
Published on 16 May 2019
Emerging markets have gained prominence as recipients of capital flows since the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008. This raises their exposure and goes hand in hand with greater dependence 
on external financing and heightened sensitivity to global shocks. However, some differences 
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can be observed across regions. For example, while the more stable types of capital flows 
(direct investment) continue to outweigh other types in Latin America, in Asia and the Middle 
East the recent increase in capital inflows has taken the form of debt, private in the case of Asia 
and mostly government debt in the Middle East. Against this background, this article examines 
the impact on the capital flows to these economies of five potential global shocks: an 
appreciation of the dollar, a fall in commodity prices, an increase in global aversion to risk, 
expectations of monetary policy tightening in the United States and lower regional growth 
compared with advanced economies. The findings of this article suggest that the factor with the 
greatest impact on portfolio flows to emerging markets is the appreciation of the dollar although, 
in the case of Latin America, commodity prices also play a very significant role.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2019 
Published on 14 May 2019
This article reviews the recent performance of the main Latin American economies, in a difficult 
external environment, owing to the slowdown in the world economy and the uncertainty associated 
with trade tensions. Growth in 2018 was lower than in 2017 and lower than projected at the start of 
the year, primarily on account of the severe recession in Argentina and a slower than expected 
recovery in Brazil. Activity is expected to be more positive in these countries in 2019, but a 
slowdown is forecast in Mexico. In addition, the risks remain predominantly on the downside. 
Among the internal risks, the uncertainty surrounding the economic policies to be implemented in 
Brazil and Mexico stands out. This issue is analysed in detail in this article. Two other articles on 
specific aspects of the performance of the Latin American economies will be published together 
with this one: “Capital flows to emerging economies: recent developments and drivers”, and “The 
impact of China on Latin America: trade and foreign direct investment channels”.
THE LATEST PROTECTIONIST TRADE TRENDS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON THE EUROPEAN UNION
Francesca Viani 
Published on 9 May 2019
In an attempt to rebalance trade with China, the United States administration decided in early 
2018 to introduce a series of protectionist measures affecting certain imports in particular. This 
gave rise to an escalation of US-China trade tensions. The new tariffs have affected a significant 
percentage of Chinese exports to the United States, but their impact on EU trade has only been 
marginal to date. The indirect effects on European economies through the global value chains 
have also been limited. However, possible tariff barriers on the automotive sector could raise 
the affected trade flows substantially.
Simulations made with econometric models confirm that the tariff measures adopted to date 
would have relatively moderate direct effects on global economic activity and on EU countries. 
That said, the simulations also warn that a decrease in business confidence and an unfavourable 
reaction by international financial markets could amplify such adverse effects. Additionally, 
possible future auto sector tariffs could have a significant impact on European economies in an 
industry already facing important challenges associated with the structural and technological 
transformation process currently under way.
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2019
Pedro del Río and Esther Gordo 
Published on 9 May 2019
Recent weaknesses in the world economy have prompted a downward revision of forecasts for 
2019. The baseline projection scenario points to a widespread easing of growth, albeit more so 
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in some areas than in others, against a backdrop of high uncertainty and significant downside 
risks. These include, most notably, the possible proliferation of protectionist measures, a 
disorderly no-deal Brexit, a sharper than expected slowdown in China or in the euro area, or a 
severe financial market adjustment. Any – or a combination – of these events could have a 
significant impact on the world economy, in a setting in which there is little room for manoeuvre 
in macroeconomic stabilisation policies.
RECENT HOUSING MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
Pana Alves and Alberto Urtasun 
Published on 11 April 2019
After the sharp correction during the crisis, activity in the Spanish real estate sector commenced 
its recovery in early 2014. This improving trend has since been observable both in quantity and 
price-based indicators. However, this market is well known for its high heterogeneity due to the 
location of the properties, their type and the nationality of purchasers. The recent buoyancy 
seems to reflect, among other factors, positive labour market developments and the low cost of 
borrowing against a backdrop of gradual growth of loans for house purchase.
THE APRIL 2019 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas 
Published on 9 April 2019
The results of the Bank Lending Survey show somewhat less expansionary behaviour of loan 
supply and demand in 2019 Q1, both in Spain and in the euro area. Thus credit standards for 
approving loans tightened in both areas in the two segments of lending to households and did 
not change in loans to enterprises. The terms and conditions for new loans held steady both in 
Spain and in the euro area, except those for consumer credit and other lending, which eased in 
Spain and tightened in the euro area. For the second quarter of 2019, the banks of both areas 
did not anticipate further tightening of credit standards save those for loans to households for 
house purchase in the euro area. Loan demand in Spain decreased both in that from enterprises 
and in that from households for consumer credit and other lending, while that from households 
for house purchase increased. By contrast, in the euro area, the demand for loans to households 
increased, although that for consumer credit and other lending slowed, and the demand for 
loans to enterprises stopped growing. According to banks in both areas, the conditions of 
access to financial markets remained unchanged or even improved, both in retail markets and 
in nearly all wholesale markets. The ECB expanded asset purchase programme continued 
having a positive effect on the liquidity and financing conditions of banks in the past six months, 
although it had a negative impact on their profitability. In addition, this programme continued to 
foster, in nearly all segments, an easing of loan terms and conditions and an increase in the 
volume of loans granted. The negative interest rate of the ECB deposit facility contributed, over 
the past six months, to a decrease in the net interest income of banks in the two areas and to 
an increase in credit volumes.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
Ana Fernández 
Published on 29 March 2019
The use of artificial intelligence tools has escalated recently in all sectors of the economy owing, 
among other factors, to the growing volume of digital data and higher computational capacity. 
Major benefits may be reaped from applying these tools to the provision of financial services, 
not only for financial institutions but also for society as a whole. This article describes some of 
those benefits, and also some of the main uses being made of these tools, both by financial 
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institutions and central banks. It also indicates the main limitations of the technology and its 
possible implications for the correct functioning of the financial system.
RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO 2018 Q4: PRELIMINARY 
YEAR-END DATA
Álvaro Menéndez y Maristela Mulino
Published on 26 March 2019
The activity of non-financial corporations remained on an upward trend in 2018, leading to 
overall increases in ordinary profit (ordinary net profit grew by 5%, up 0.3 pp from 2017) and 
employment, which were also seen in most sectors and firms. As a result of the good corporate 
earnings performance, average rates of return continued to improve, and the spread over the 
cost of borrowing widened further. Extraordinary revenue and costs had a positive impact on 
net profit in 2018, resulting in strong net profit growth. Average debt ratios, relative to assets 
and ordinary profit, fell. Lastly, the debt burden ratio also declined, driven by the lower cost of 
borrowing and the growth in surpluses. A box analysing the recent developments in trade credit 
and average payment and collection periods is included in this article.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with the protocol order, the EU Member States are listed 
using the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
AIReF Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility
AMCESFI Macroprudential Authority Financial Stability Board
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MREL Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
